1. Suppression of the Atlantic slave trade: Abolition from ship to shore

Robert Burroughs

This study provides fresh perspectives on critical aspects of the British Royal Navy’s suppression of the Atlantic slave trade. It is divided into three sections. The first, Policies, presents a new interpretation of the political framework under which slave-trade suppression was executed. Section II, Practices, examines details of the work of the navy’s West African Squadron which have been passed over in earlier narrative accounts. Section III, Representations, provides the first sustained discussion of the squadron’s wider, cultural significance, and its role in the shaping of geographical knowledge of West Africa. One of our objectives in looking across these three areas—a view from shore to ship and back again—is to understand better how they overlap. Our authors study the interconnections between political and legal decision-making, practical implementation, and cultural production and reception in an anti-slavery pursuit undertaken far from the metropolitan centres in which it was first conceived. Such an approach promises new insights into what the anti-slave-trade patrols meant to Britain and what the campaign of ‘liberation’ meant for those enslaved Africans and naval personnel, including black sailors, whose lives were most closely entangled in it.

The following chapters reassess the policies, practices, and representations of slave-trade suppression by building upon developments in research in political, legal and humanitarian history, naval, imperial and maritime history, medical history, race relations and migration, abolitionist literature and art, nineteenth-century geography, nautical literature and art, and representations of Africa. Topics that this book encompass are accordingly varied, and include: the origins and implementation of the suppression policy; the rise of ‘anti-coercionist’ challenges to naval deployment in West Africa in the mid-nineteenth-
century, and the failure of those challenges; responses to Britain’s abolitionist policy from
outside of Britain; Britain’s imperial belligerence in enforcing the anti-slave-trade patrols;
emotional responses of officers and sailors to this task; race-relations in the West African
squadron; health histories; the transition of liberated Africans into apprenticeship in the
colonies; images of officers, sailors, slaves, and slave traders in representations of slave-trade
suppression; and the impact of this endeavour upon British perceptions of West Africa.

A scholarly reassessment of the long-running coercive crusade against the trafficking
of enslaved Africans to the Americas is overdue. In the years since Eric Williams’s
*Capitalism and Slavery* (1944) fundamentally challenged self-satisfied and complacent
histories of Britain’s anti-slavery movement, and ignited scholarly inquiry into the slave trade
and slavery in the Atlantic world, slave-trade suppression has been valuably examined in
several studies.¹ These works mainly focus upon the economic and political shaping of all or
certain parts of the Atlantic world, often with particular attention to questions of international
diplomacy and law.² Discussions by maritime and slave-trade historians, centred on the
policies and practices of arresting the commerce, have hitherto tended to fall back on
accounts by the naval historians Christopher Lloyd (1949) and W.E.F Ward (1969),³ while the
cultural significance of slave-trade suppression in nineteenth-century Britain has received
little attention despite the increase in studies of this dimension of slavery and
abolition.⁴ Lloyd’s and Ward’s accounts contain much useful anecdotal information, and both
are particularly strong in detailing the suffering of naval crews chasing ‘slavers’ in West
Africa. However, both are written in admiring tones which assume humanitarian motives for
naval suppression as much as they presume patriotic pride on behalf of the reader. They
encourage the understanding of slave-trade suppression as an end-point, a self-satisfied
conclusion, in triumphalist narratives of Britain’s emergence as a leading anti-slavery nation.

As many commentators note, official and popular commentaries on British history
traditionally linger on the presumed beneficence of abolition of slave trading and/or slavery, rather than other parts of that history such as Britons’ leading role in trafficking and exploitation. This was notoriously the case with many of the events in 2007 that marked the bicentennial commemorations of the Abolition Act. Slave-trade suppression featured then primarily in specialist (military) events which at times echoed the laudatory tone of the historical sources that they drew upon. Richard Huzzey and John MacAleer explore these recent representations in the Ch. 8 this volume.

Another by-product of the 2007 remembrances, Siân Rees’s history of slave-trade suppression, *Sweet Water and Bitter: The Ships that Stopped the Slave Trade* (2008), significantly improves upon its forebears by retelling the rich anecdotal history of the West African Squadron in newly clear, chronological form. Rees makes particularly good use of the *Sierra Leone Gazette* in shedding new light on the early years of the pursuit, and pays much-required attention to African perspectives and life-stories. Even so, Rees at times repeats Lloyd’s and Ward’s moralistic interpretation of events in which support for and service in the squadron is interpreted as an innate response to the violence of slavery, or an act of personal or national atonement. By reassessing the policies, practices, and representations of slave-trade suppression, our contributors seek to address the thornier questions raised by a campaign apparently founded on national atonement and altruism in an age of empire and aggrandisement, on vast financial and military commitment in an age of colonial retrenchment, and on the universalist rhetoric of the anti-slavery movement in an age of nationalism and competing views on racial difference. The remainder of this chapter offers supporting information on the Atlantic slave trade in the nineteenth century and the efforts of the navy to eliminate it, and introduces the following chapters. Along the way I explain further our objectives for this volume by comparing our concerns and emphases to those of previous histories of slave-trade suppression.
The Atlantic slave trade entered a new and uncertain phase after the British Government passed the Abolition Act (1807) to outlaw British participation in the industry as of January 1808. The act led to a sharp decrease in the volume of slave trading, as only a small number of British merchants and captains continued illicitly in the trade, running the risk of confiscation of their ship and a fine of £100 for every slave found in their possession. Domestic laws were reinforced to extinguish the embers of the British traffic. From 1811 Britons’ slave trading was punishable by 14 years’ transportation; three years later Britons’ lending of capital to non-British slave merchants was prohibited. These laws brought a swift end to British merchants’ open participation in the slave trade. Yet the traffic persisted, and rapidly regenerated, as slave traders from throughout the Atlantic world filled the vacuum created by British withdrawal by operating under the colours of other nations that had yet to enforce meaningful anti-slave-trade laws. By the 1820s, the volume of Atlantic slave-trading was nearly as great as it had been in its all-time peak decades, the 1780s and 1790s. Illegality makes it harder to find written records, but British support for and involvement in the slave trade probably also recovered over time as merchants sought loopholes and conspiracies to continue profiting.

The decline in British slave-dealing was nonetheless momentous because of the scale of the nation’s participation in the trade prior to 1808. According to the important research of the ‘Transatlantic Slave Trade Voyages’ project, an estimated 12.5 million enslaved Africans were entered into the Atlantic slave traffic. (Of those embarked, approximately 10.7 million arrived in the Americas. Most of the remaining 1.8 million persons were killed at sea.) More than a quarter of the total number travelled on English or British ships. Portugal was the most active slave-trading nation over the long history of the slave trade, but David Eltis and David Richardson calculate that Britons dominated the slave trade in eight of the thirteen decades.
between 1681 and 1807. The peak years of British slave trading were those immediately prior to the Abolition Act. In the 1780s and 1790s, Britons took away roughly 45% of all enslaved Africans bound for the Americas.\(^9\)

As it became apparent that the trade would continue in the hands of other nations, the British government set about enforcing abolition by means of what Serge Daget describes as a ‘supranational policy’ of legal and diplomatic pressure, naval patrolling, and confiscation of slave ships and their human cargoes at courts of mixed commission.\(^{10}\) While Britain remained at war, its navy seized slave ships sailing under the flags of its enemies France, Holland and Spain, taking their human cargoes as contraband, as it had done throughout the Napoleonic Wars in accordance with wartime belligerent rights. Despite not possessing the legal authority, the navy also detained slave ships sailing under the U.S. and Danish flags on the premise that it acted on behalf of these nations, which had illegalised the trade. After the Strangford Treaty of 1810, which outlawed Portuguese slave-trading outside of its own dominions and fixed import taxes on British goods entering Brazil, Portuguese (including Brazilian) ships also were intercepted unless they could prove that they were travelling between Portuguese ports. There is little question that during the war the navy operated on the fringes of, and sometimes outside, international law.\(^{11}\)

Almost immediately after the Napoleonic Wars, the seizure of the French ship *Louis* by HMS *Queen Charlotte* caused a legal controversy that tested and defeated Britain’s right to search suspected (and actual) slave traders. It then became imperative that government officials (in particular the Foreign Secretaries Castlereagh and Canning) and abolitionist leaders intensify their campaign ‘to coax or coerce’ the other maritime powers in the Atlantic, plus the slave-trading states of Africa, to sign anti-slave-trade treaties with Britain, impose their own abolition laws, establish their own anti-slave-trade squadrons, participate in courts of mixed commission, and grant the British navy rights to help enforce their legislation.\(^{12}\)
1819, the navy had installed a permanent squadron off the west coast of Africa. It would remain in place until 1870. At its peak in the mid- to late-1840s, Britain’s West African squadron annually comprised in excess of 36 vessels and 4,000 personnel. These figures represent roughly 15% of warships then in commission, and one tenth of the naval workforce.\textsuperscript{13}

Statistics only tell us so much about the extent of the British government’s commitment to these patrols. Lord Palmerston’s famous comment that ‘[i]f there was a particularly old slow-going tub in the Navy she was sure to be sent to the coast of Africa to try and catch the fast sailing American clippers’ needs to be read in context as a hyperbolic complaint to Russell about the Admiralty’s frustration of his plans.\textsuperscript{14} Naval historians have nevertheless agreed that the navy was for the most part ill-provisioned to perform its task. In most years, the squadron that patrolled the West African coast was too small, and its ships too old or low-rating, to offer a major threat to illegal slave trading. And yet the military inadequacy of the force does not negate the surprising cost and commitment to suppression throughout a period of fiscal retrenchment.\textsuperscript{15} In the first section of this book, Richard Huzzey traces the political debates which framed legal and diplomatic policies for the British state’s waning but unbroken commitment to slave-trade suppression. He considers the popularity of this campaign and assesses the motives of subsequent generations of politicians who maintained, and occasionally challenged, the anti-slave-trade patrols.

One of the main aims of this volume is to come to a more nuanced understanding of the motivations behind Britain’s anti-slave-trade policies and actions. This entails studying the work of slave-trade suppression with awareness of its political motivations and repercussions, its practical difficulties and the impact of these on enslaved peoples, former slaves, and naval sailors, and the broader cultural and ideological framework of the political and practical considerations of the campaign. Far from discounting morality as a motivating
factor, we seek to examine how moral motives might figure in this context. Lloyd’s view that
the squadron was launched out of ‘purely philanthropic motives’ understates the complexity
and the momentousness of Britain’s transition from leading poacher to gamekeeper of the
slave trade, for the nation as a whole (or at least its vocal minority), and for the navy as an
institution.16 Prior to 1807, the navy had looked favourably upon the slave trade as a
‘nursery’ for seamen helping to preserve naval supremacy, especially at times of war. Naval
members of the House of Commons voted against abolition,17 Nelson famously spoke out
against Wilberforce, while naval commanders turned a blind eye to the illegal trade between
the West Indies and the USA. Most naval protection of the British slave trade had of course
been undertaken in the straightforward preservation of the nation’s mercantile trade. Even the
last British ships legally to carry slaves from Africa did so, in October 1807, under escort of a
naval frigate to guard against attacks by enemy navies.18 Points such as this remind us that
the African Squadron was the product of an unlikely union between the navy and the anti-
slavery society, two institutions with different conceptualisations of freedom. Many of its
policies and practices bear the mark of this ambiguity, as do representations of them.

To understand morality as one contingent and conditional factor among several
others, including less savoury incentives such as prize monies, is to treat the human agents of
Britain’s anti-slave-trade initiatives as three-dimensional beings acting in a moment of
complicated historical change. If at times the humans seem less than humane, then they seem
no less human for it. Indeed, the moralistic interpretation of events tends to represent naval
personnel assigned to anti-slave-trade policing as unreflexive, and, in more ways than
one, self-less agents of imperial power founded on humanitarian convictions. Rees, for
example, characterises sailors in this context as guided by an unconscious humanitarianism—
‘inflexibly xenophobic, unthinkingly racist yet dying in their thousands to save individuals
with whom they had nothing in common but humanity.’19 While the debate continues as to
the severity of conditions of service in the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century navy, it is unsafe to assume that sailors did or did not recognise shared humanity with enslaved Africans. Life at sea might have desensitised sailors to this point. Alongside Rees’s interpretation we might place the fictional tars (including press-gang victims) in Captain Marryat’s *Peter Simple* (1834), who, when petitioned to donate wages to the anti-slavery movement by a West Indian missionary, curtly reply, ‘[t]he nigger’s better off [than] we’.

Domestic debates and calculations such as the sailor’s rights movement were framed by the international context of suppression. The British forces were joined sporadically by squadrons from the navies of France, Portugal, and the USA—although only during the brief Paine-Tucker accord of 1840 did any of these squadrons (those of Britain and the USA) work co-dependently with one another. The Royal Navy’s campaigns generated more hostility than amity with foreign nations. Most of the Atlantic powers were unwilling or unable to enforce meaningful measures against their merchants’ trade in slaves. They had not experienced the same levels of abolitionist sentiment as had Britain, their navies were weaker than Britain’s, in part because of war, and so too were their economies more dependent on slavery. The resistance of other governments to Britain’s campaign posed an insurmountable difficulty for ships on the anti-slave-trade patrols: as long as one nation refused to enter into effectual bilateral agreements with Britain, slave traders could continue to operate by raising that nation’s flag if approached by naval patrollers. If boarded, they could show forged documentation of the ship’s place of origin. Slave-ship captains travelled with more than one set of papers and flags, and evaded capture by employing these appropriately according to geographical location and current legislation. As foreign ministers worked to close the loopholes, anti-slave-trade officers were charged with navigating a labyrinthine, and ever-shifting, network of treaties. For naval captains this meant continuing economic risk in capturing slave ships. They were forced to weigh the pecuniary incentives of seizing slave-
ship prizes against the threat of personal liability for the compensation of merchants who
could prove--legitimately or otherwise--that their ship had been illegally condemned.

Taking into consideration the various practical problems of naval suppression, in her
chapter in Section II of this volume Mary Wills considers the responses of officers serving on
the squadron, exploring how far faith, profits and honour shaped their responses to the
assignment. Much of the disquiet among sailors and the Admiralty came from the fearful
mortality rates on British naval vessels assigned to West Africa. The morale-sapping effects
of death--be it in the infrequent but fierce battles against slave-ship crews, or, as was more
likely, through infection by tropical diseases--profoundly determined naval sailors’ attitudes
to the squadron. John Rankin’s chapter in Section II further delineates the health of sailors of
European and African descent, finding that the latter were deemed more suited to the
unhealthy climate and consequently given more unenviable tasks and more aggressive
medical treatments. Although they are frequently overlooked in previous historical studies,
black seamen were thus crucial to the day-to-day practices of slave-trade suppression.

Given the costs for Britain in blood and coin, it is hardly surprising that some of the
sailors who worked in it, as well as the taxpayers who financed it, viewed the campaign
uncharitably. While many commentators of the nineteenth century saw in it cause for benign
celebration of British far-sightedness, others questioned its effectiveness. As several
contemporary observers noted, as long as it could not stop the trade, the navy may have
exacerbated the suffering of the enslaved on Atlantic crossings by forcing the once legitimate
trade into the hands of individuals who adopted ever more mercenary and hazardous tactics to
ship the largest possible quantities of Africans to the Americas. This realisation raised
questions about the value of suppression as a moral act which are not straightforwardly settled
by pointing to the squadron’s successes. Those periods in which the navy appeared to be
making the greatest in-roads by capturing large numbers of slave traders, thanks in part to
changes in treaty obligations and naval strategies, for example, often reflect proportionate increases in slave-trading activity. As Eltis notes, while the squadron may have checked the growth of the slave trade, only when the British government imposed its self-perceived moral authority upon the governments of other nations, in particular Portugal and Brazil, could it effect change in regions and markets beyond its formal control. Aside from British insults to the sovereignty of Portugal and Brazil, recent research by Robin Law suggests that anti-slave-trade agreements made in West Africa laid the groundwork for British presumption and colonial expansion by discriminating against the sovereign rights of ‘uncivilised’ peoples.

Even then the navy could not fully stop the supply so long as demand for slaves and legal protection for slave traders existed in the Americas.

And yet in spite of the various complications, between 1808 and 1867 the navy intercepted more than 1,600 slave ships carrying approximately 160,000 slaves bound for the Americas. Naval suppression further proved a deterrent to the trade by increasing costs and risks. In most likely curbing the growth of the industry, it effectively prevented hundreds of thousands of Africans’ undergoing the trauma of the Atlantic crossing and enslavement in the Americas.

This is not necessarily to say that these same Africans won freedom thanks to the work of the West African Squadron. The liberty afforded to the individuals who entered as apprentices into the fledging colonial society of Sierra Leone or were shipped as ‘free emigrants’ to the West Indies cannot be clearly distinguished from the bonded labour awaiting them had their enslavers completed the voyage to the Americas. As Emma Christopher shows in Ch. 4 of this volume, the British authorities showed contempt for the abilities and liberties of those individuals it tellingly labelled as ‘recaptives’ and ‘freed slaves’. Christopher centres her enquiry on early records from Freetown, Sierra Leone, the hub of anti-slave-trade activity.
J. R. Oldfield comments that one of the most striking aspects of the history of Atlantic slavery ‘is its silencing of African perspectives, and, in particular, the suffering of the millions who were sold into slavery.’ Histories of slave-trade suppression tend to bear out this observation. Another main aim of this volume is to highlight the impact of anti-slave-trade measures upon enslaved and formerly enslaved Africans, and the lack of attention to African perspectives in earlier (including contemporaneous) writings about the subject. As noted before, the books by Lloyd and Ward not only prioritise white perspectives but also white suffering on the preventive patrols, though Rees’s book already has done much valuable work in drawing upon West African historiography to fill in the noticeable gap in African experiences. New research in this volume on the handling of ‘recaptives’ in Sierra Leone, and the medical treatment of blacks on naval vessels, adds to our understanding of the African experience of anti-slave-trade patrols. In particular, this research makes clear that the lack of African perspectives consulted in contemporary discussions, and in subsequent histories and memorialisation of the West African Squadron, should not be assumed to denote a lack of agency on the part of enslaved peoples, or other Africans involved in suppression. Just as historians have recovered histories of resistance to the slave trade and slavery, so one of the most pressing tasks for researchers of slave-trade suppression is to recall the variety of black experiences of and roles in it and the trade it sought to curb.

The experiences of sailors and Africans ashore and on ship often stand in contrast to contemporaneous representations of naval suppression. Robert Burroughs considers the ambiguities of British writers’ representations of the West African Squadron in his part of section III. As with political debate, literary representations contested the meanings of the campaign, and ideas and impressions about the slave trade, its victims, perpetrators and prosecutors further informed the ways Britons imagined themselves in relation to other peoples and places. Perhaps above all other territories, this is the case with West Africa.
Eltis writes that ‘[d]espite occasional redeployment of cruisers from West Africa to Brazil and the Caribbean, the centre of suppression was always on the west coast of Africa.’ More than 85% of all slave-ship captures took place there. On top of the legal and diplomatic implications of suppression policies for the future of British imperialism in Africa, the naval campaigns played an important part in framing images of the continent and, in particular, its west coast. In his chapter for section III David Lambert examines how the suppression campaign forged geographical knowledge and expert prejudices in the metropole.

As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, a further aim of this volume is to identify the cross-fertilisation of ideas and understandings of the anti-slave-trade squadron among its metropolitan architects, critics, and other interested parties, and those who experienced it at the coal-face. Generally speaking, Lloyd understands this flow of information to be one-way: from ship to shore. As naval captains witnessed horrors of the slave trade, they were converted to the anti-slavery cause, supplying the evidence that persuaded far-seeing politicians such as Russell to push home the measures required to eliminate the trade. In contrast, Williams and his followers focus on the flow of information from shore to ship: economic and political considerations in the metropolitan centres of empire forced the government’s hand in pursuing its anti-slave-trade agenda, no matter the various hardships it inflicted upon sailors, recaptives, and enslaved Africans. Taken together, the following chapters identify a complex, transformative negotiation of knowledge and understanding of the African Squadron, one in which the ship, and the maritime world more broadly, is found to help shape, and not just passively reflect, the cultural, political and other spheres of nineteenth-century Britain. One of the main examples of this is the literal dis-illusionment that takes place as naval personnel contemplated philanthropic ideals amid the complicated reality of patrolling the African coast. While working to suppress the subsidiary trade in the southern Indian Ocean of slaves bound for the Americas, for example, Lt. F.L. Barnard
criticised ‘Englishmen, who annihilate the slave-dealers and civilize Africa by their own comfortable firesides, little thinking of the hardships and privations their countrymen are undergoing to carry out their impossible theories.’32 Although the straightforwardness of this view from the fireside is upheld in the writings of some eyewitnesses, sobering appraisals such as Barnard’s would also feed back into metropolitan discussions, changing home-grown expectations and priorities in the process. This understanding of the ship and its environs as units of cultural exchange that inform ‘the centre’ has the effect, advised by Paul Gilroy, of challenging ‘the unthinking assumption that cultures always flow into patterns congruent with the borders of essentially homogeneous nation states’.33

The image of slave-trade suppression has changed not only in different spheres but also over time. Our final chapter considers how the nineteenth-century suppression of the slave trade has survived in British public memory, tracing early commemorations through to the museums and political debates of our own times. Huzzey and John McAleer examine how those with divergent agendas have appropriated the history of suppression to recover different uses of the past for the present.

The British navy’s campaign to suppress the Atlantic slave trade ran for more than half a century, and in that time it directly impacted upon several nations and peoples of Africa, Europe, and the Americas. It is a history of hemispheric proportions. Far from attempting comprehensive coverage, the present study works toward the objectives that I have outlined above through detailed discussion of particular issues, regions, and time-frames. We have focused almost exclusively on British naval operations, and much of our discussion is centred on activities in and around the West African coast, which was the centre-ground of preventive action. Further research may profitably look at the anti-slave-trade squadrons despatched by the navies of other nations, both in terms of their direct engagements with the
slave trade and in their interrelationship with the dominant, British presence, and at the work of other British squadrons beyond West Africa. In view of the danger of ‘maritimization’ of the history of transatlantic slavery, which in truth stemmed from and shaped industrial centres far removed from the ports of the Atlantic world, researchers need also to trace deeper-lying metropolitan connections to the post-1808 traffic. This is not to mention the ‘many middle passages’ and other anti-slave-trade activities beyond the Atlantic world, including (but not limited to) the campaigns against the Indian-ocean slave trade, the Swahili-Arab slave traffic across the Sahara to North Africa, the Ottoman Empire, and India, and the trafficking of indentured labourers from the Pacific Islands to Queensland, Australia. The subject is practically inexhaustible, and doubtless future studies of anti-slave-trade operations at different historical junctures and geographical loci—the many ships, ports and courts that comprise this history—will complicate as well as corroborate the arguments advanced here. We submit this collaborative venture as a new history of slave-trade suppression, not the final one, and a collective intervention in an important episode in the histories of slavery, empire, and nineteenth-century Britain.

Notes


2 Important studies include Leslie Bethell, ‘The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of African Historical Studies 7 (1966), 79-93; Johnson U.J. Asiegbu, Slavery and the Politics of Liberation, 1787-


5 In accounting for Lt. Joseph Denman’s aggressive assault on slave-holders of the Gallinas River, for example, Rees’s comment that this naval officer ‘had already served on the African coast as lieutenant and been converted to active abolitionism by the horrors he had seen there’, echoes Lloyd’s assertion that ‘[s]uch an initiation into the horrors of the trade bit deep into the young man’s mind… The ruthless methods he subsequently adopted clearly owe their origin to that experience’. Siân Rees, *Sweet Water and Bitter: The Ships that Stopped the Slave Trade* (London: Chatto and Windus, 2008), p. 202; Lloyd, *The Navy and the Slave Trade*, p. 93. I pursue representations of this kind in Ch. 6 of this study.


Huzzey discusses the stubborn problem of Britons’ indirect benefitting from the slave trade in his chapter for this volume.

8 Eltis and Richardson, ‘New Assessment’, pp. 37, 45
12 Bethell, Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, p. x
14 Qtd. in Bethell, Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, 1970, p. 124.
15 Examining the campaign as humanitarian intervention, the social scientists Kaufman and Papenominate it as, in relative terms, the costliest moral action in modern history. Chaim D. Kaufmann and Robert A. Pape, ‘Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain's Sixty-Year Campaign against the Atlantic Slave Trade’, International Organization, 53 (1999), 631-68.
16 Lloyd, Navy and the Slave Trade, p. xiii.
18 Rees, Salt Water and Bitter, p. 8.
19 Rees, Salt Water and Bitter, p. 6.


27 LeVeen calculates that 660,000 Africans were spared the Atlantic crossing because of the anti-slave-trade patrols. *British Slave Trade Suppression Policies*, p. 60. But see also LeVeen’s evaluation of this figure on pp. 58-60. Eltis gives the figure of 213,000 for the period after 1830 in ‘Volume and Structure’, p. 43, Table 7.


29 On the propensity of white writers about Atlantic slavery to appropriate suffering in the forging of narratives of guilt and redemption, see Marcus Wood, *Slavery, Empathy, and Pornography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

31 Eltis, Economic Growth, pp. 91, 100; see also Bethell, Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, p. 84.


