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## AFTERWORD

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“*Nul ne sait écrire*” is the opening to *Lectures d'enfance*. This short statement has a terse, poetic construction that begins to intrigue the reader as to what the book might be. Hiding in the elegant simplicity of the Galilée *débats* series with cream cover and title in a light red serif font, the svelte volume echoes Lyotard's collection published three years previously—*L'Inhumain*, which similarly opened with a seemingly esoteric evocation of its concerns, thereby dovetailing in some ways with *Lectures d'enfance*.

“Nobody knows how to write” is the English translation chosen to render this opening to *Readings in Infancy*. It both opens new possibilities—nobody—and closes—*nul*—simultaneously. This nobody might evoke the desperate cry of the one-eyed Polyphemus, blinded by Odysseus and whose lament is heard yet not listened to by its monocular kind, heard only as the nonsense of “nobody (*outis*) is killing me” that rings out across the island, the victim of cunning. *Nul* does not necessarily connect with persons—no one, or bodies—nobody, not even with mythical creatures, but rather it allows, through its opening, a nothing which is unanchored from the personhood of no one. *Personne ne sait écrire* might properly match the phrase we have chosen, but for Lyotard the personlessness of *nul* and the duality of the negative carries an important timbre, forcing us to acknowledge what we lose in *lexis*. However, judgments must be made—that is the one exigency Lyotard is emphatic about: the demand to link. Linking on to *Lectures d'enfance* is what we have undertaken through this publication of *Readings in Infancy*, linking on to Lyotard's French and the disparate extant English translations to show once more that we do not know how to write, and in doing so we respond to the loss of the anonymous *nul*.

In order to better understand or at least conceptualize where *Readings in Infancy* sits within Lyotard's thought, it is useful to sketch out the intellectual biography to which it belongs. In an attempt to avoid a simplistic model of linear development many areas of study have eschewed straightforward patterns of influence to think rather of multiplicities of contributing factors. In Art History for example, out goes Alfred H. Barr's famous all-explaining history of modern art drawn for MoMA New York in 1936, with its inexorable forward movement of the Western avant-garde to its apogee

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in the abstract art of its time. This is replaced with models such as the “constellations” offered by Tate in the UK, especially its displays in Liverpool, allowing more diverse sources to coexist in a networked presentation of its collection. While there are limitations to such constellations—not least the comparatively short historic and geographical reach of the references—they do at least refute notions of the lone artist forging ahead in blind disbelief that they do not need the support or succor of others. Considering where *Readings in Infancy* “fits” in the constellation I will sketch out here might compel us to consider overlooked associations.

There are some through lines, some constant points of reference, with which we may begin this task: Immanuel Kant, in particular the third Critique, but also the body of historico-political writings, was a regular if not constant source of study for Lyotard throughout the decade which preceded the publication of *Readings in Infancy* (1991). Lyotard’s interpretation of Kant’s work played an important role in *The Differend* (1983) which incorporated explorations of judgment from *Just Gaming* (1979), the result of conversations with Jean-Loup Thébaud in 1977–8 prompted by accusations of ethical vacuity evidenced in the notorious 1974 publication, *Libidinal Economy*. This concern with both justice and judgment following Kant, in particular the reflective, indeterminate judgment of the third Critique, was the focus of the 1982 conference at Cerisy-la-Salle, organized by Thébaud and Michel Enaudeau under the title *Comment juger?* (How to Judge?). Including contributions by Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, it took place at an important point in the development of what would become *The Differend*, forcing participants who dealt with Lyotard’s work to consider recent—though now often overlooked—publications including *Just Gaming*, but also his 1977 book on Marcel Duchamp, *Duchamp’s Transformers*. Derrida refers to these texts in the long introduction to his contribution to the conference, *Préjugés: Devant la loi*.<sup>1</sup> Derrida’s presentation was an extensive rewriting of an existing paper on Kafka’s short story, “Before the Law” (*Vor dem Gesetz* is given as *Devant la loi* in French), which provokes echoes in Lyotard’s later paper on Kafka, first delivered at a conference in 1989 under the title *Avant la loi* (also “Before the law”) and included in *Readings in Infancy* as “Prescription.”<sup>2</sup>

The encounter with Derrida cannot be downplayed and his prominence for Lyotard as a member of the 1980s constellation is almost unquestioned, in a way that would not necessarily have seemed the case in the previous decade. There had been earlier encounters, but 1982 can be seen as a

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decisive intellectual meeting point. In addition, there were other more practical spheres of encounter at this time: Corinne Enaudeau writes of their meeting at the Association Jan Hus,<sup>3</sup> the support organization for academics behind the iron curtain in Czechoslovakia, the French branch of which Derrida co-founded in 1981 (and for which he was infamously temporarily arrested on his return from Prague while carrying planted drugs). Lyotard also worked alongside Derrida in the foundation of the Collège international de philosophie when he was called on to deputize for his close friend and colleague François Châtelet, due to illness. Lyotard is often overlooked in the account of the official founding figures, given as Derrida, Châtelet, Jean-Pierre Faye and Dominique Lecourt, no doubt due to Lyotard's self-effacement. The Collège was to play a central role for Lyotard during the remainder of his life and several of the contributions which make up *Readings in Infancy*—Kafka, Arendt, and Valéry—were first presented under its auspices. Similarly, many of the figures present at Cerisy were frequent contributors to the symposia, workshops, and conferences organized by the Collège.

What also becomes clear through a brief excursus into the arenas and contexts from which these readings in infancy emerged is the seemingly disparate foci of the events on Joyce, Arendt, and Freud which gave rise to their corresponding chapters. Yet despite this, there is a manifest connection that runs through the work as a coherent whole. Lyotard writes of the preexisting network of names, associations, expectations, and assumptions into which the infant is born, underlining both the myth of individualized subjectivity and the limited contingency of beginnings. It is from a similar preexisting network that *Readings in Infancy* is born. Consequently, I will labor here a while to detail the means by which the constituent elements were arrived at in order to better understand the position of the volume as other than simply a collection. On the one hand, this is a collection of recently delivered seminars and conference papers, often already published in conference proceedings, and transformed into chapters with minimal intervention beyond the simplification of the chapter titles to neat single words, accompanied in the table of contents by the name of its subject or interlocutor. On the other, it feels as though the readings, to use our nominated English title, have been born out of subterranean linkages which allow the constituent elements to function together remarkably without repetition and with very limited revisions.

“Return: Joyce” was a contribution to the Eleventh International James Joyce symposium in Venice, June 1988, under the title “Retour sur

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le retour” (Return Upon the Return). Derrida had presented at the same symposium four years earlier, with Joyce’s multiple yeses as his topic. Such a Joycean “yes, yes, yes, yes” is how Lyotard ended his *Libidinal Economy* in 1974, but by the time of “Return” such confident affirmation had drifted. In 1984, Derrida had played with the French “yes”—*oui, Oui*—and its always possible quotation, slipping on the impossibility of translating either linguistically or graphically.<sup>4</sup> In his “Return,” Lyotard asks: “[h]ow can one be sure that what returns is precisely what has disappeared?”<sup>5</sup> It might then be possible to read these two responses to Joyce together, though I am not aware if anyone has made those two paths cross, unlike their respective responses to Kafka.

“Prescription: Kafka” was first presented as *Avant la loi*, as detailed earlier, to a Franco-German conference titled *Morale et Politique* (Politics and Morality) under the auspices of the CIPh, a three-day event in March 1989. It was subsequently published as “La Prescription” in the journal of the Collège, *Rue Descartes*, and in English translation as “Prescription,” in the French studies journal of Johns Hopkins University, *L’Esprit créateur*, both in 1991. Lyotard’s request or demand: “translate this” made to Christopher Fynsk was the prompt not only for the resulting translation but also a later elegiac essay “Jean-François’s Infancy” (2001),<sup>6</sup> itself an insightful consideration of many aspects of *Lectures d’enfance*.

“Survivor: Arendt” was given as “Le Survivant” in April 1988 at a three-day event at the Goethe Institute in Paris, convened jointly with the CIPh and titled *Politique et pensée* (Politics and Thought). Participants included Paul Ricoeur and Barbara Cassin among many other distinguished thinkers. Also listed as a participant, but without mention in the subsequent proceedings, is Giorgio Agamben, a figure for whom the theme of infancy plays a different role, but one which I will examine later in this afterword. I am tempted to list all the participants in this event because of the sense of the milieu which is evoked and the centrality of the CIPh to the intellectual life of French thought at this time. Rather than take such a detour, however, I continue to follow the sequence of Lyotard’s *Readings in Infancy* and hit the stumbling block that is the chapter on Jean-Paul Sartre.

In contrast to the other chapters which result from spoken contributions to events dating from 1988–90, the chapter “Words: Sartre” originated as a written article, first published in the journal *Critique* in 1983. Ostensibly a book review, it was written as a favor to a friend, Denis Hollier, on the occasion of the publication of his *Politique de la prose: Jean-Paul Sartre et l’an quarante* (*The Politics of Prose: Jean-Paul Sartre and the 1940s*).

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Published as *Un Succès de Sartre* (A Success of Sartre's), the tone toward its subject is bitter and harsh in a way that contrasts with the other chapters, where there is admiration even in disagreement, and reveals a political difference that is intensely felt. The somewhat sarcastic title was maintained when appended as a foreword to the English translation of Hollier's book published in 1986, but reconfigured simply as "Mots" (Words) in *Lectures d'enfance*. It is an important companion to the previous chapter on Arendt whose distinctly darker post-war narrative casts a shadow over Sartre's valedictory *littérature engagée* (committed writing). The subtitle of Hollier's book in French—*Sartre et l'an quarante*—carries both an implicit reference to the fall of Paris in 1940 and puns on the French expression to not give a shit about something (see note 59, [in "Words"]); while this untranslatable subtitle may have vanished from the title when published in English, its sense remains written throughout Lyotard's account.

The title to Lyotard's chapter, "Words" returns the apparently triumphalist title of Sartre's autobiography, *The Words* with a note of derision. This is particularly apparent in his defense of Claude Lefort, a former member with Lyotard of the anti-authoritarian, anti-PCF (French Communist Party) Marxist group *Socialisme ou barbarie* and with whom Sartre had significant battles in print. Lyotard is clear from the outset: "I did not like the air of capability his writings exuded" and even when he finds areas of agreement with Sartre's pronouncements on writing, he insists that they be divested of his emphasis on the authorial *I*, returning rather to writing itself, that uncertain element which Sartre refused to permit.

The decision to write about Sartre was not entered into altogether willingly it seems. In the essay, there is the suggestion of perhaps being pushed not only by Hollier but also by his son-in-law, Michel Enaudeau. However, the same is not true of the prompt that led to "Disorder: Valéry." Lyotard's turn to the aesthetic work of Paul Valéry came only from the phrase *Ceci est de l'art* (this is art) provided by Thierry de Duve in another cooperation with the CIPh: a small symposium organized by de Duve in the public library of the Centre Georges Pompidou. Lyotard, Louis Marin, and Jacques Poulain responded to the same phrase, but only Lyotard chose to reference Valéry's aesthetics.<sup>7</sup> It is in the resulting section of *Readings in Infancy* that aspects of the linguistics of pragmatics from *The Differend* are recalled most directly, with the deictic "this" of the sentence "this is art" being explored as the missing contents, thereby mimicking the shift from Sartre's confident title *The Words* to Lyotard's more dissolute "Words" in the previous chapter: doubt and hesitancy replace the assumption of capability.

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Several commentators have made the connection between *Readings in Infancy* and *Discourse, Figure*, published two decades before, with the consideration of Freud's case "A Child Is Being Beaten" being one point of connection; others refer to the matrilineal aspect of desire at the heart of the figural nominated the *figure-matrice* (matrix-figure) or the important readings of negation which include Lyotard's own modified translation of Freud's *Verneinung*.<sup>8</sup> In each case, it is the plurality of voices that are being considered, the various roles being played in order to deny, repress, or indicate that which cannot be voiced through discourse yet which inhabits discourse, as that force of incapacity which Sartre of *The Words* denied. It is in the final chapter of *Readings in Infancy*, "Voices: Freud," that this is perhaps most explicitly displayed yet its concerns are echoed throughout the five previous chapters and its enigmatic preface. "Voices" is an English title that has to compromise the ambiguity of the French, where *Voix* (without article) does not clearly designate either singular or plural, yet whose plurality is implicit in the writings of the chapter. Lyotard's discussion is of the Freud case known as that of the "Rat Man," the account of which exists already in the plural: Freud wrote both a series of journal entries recording the case and a more conventional case history. Lyotard's essay was presented to the Psychoanalytic Association of France in May 1990 as part of a series on case histories organized by Michel Gribinski and published in the *Nouvelle Revue de psychanalyse* in the autumn of the same year, with the longer title *Les voix d'un voix* (Voices of a Voice).

"Voices: Freud" serves as a good example of how the material included in *Readings in Infancy* cuts through both Lyotard's work and theoretical interests in different ways. It is an essay that is key to his work on Freud, one that stretches back to the controversial *Figure forclos* (Figure Foreclosed) written in 1968 but not published until 1984 and returned to in *Discourse, Figure*, the libidinal work, and then repeatedly in late essays such as "Emma," as Robert Harvey highlights in the foreword to this volume. It is a thread through Lyotard's thought that is critically discussed by Élisabeth de Fontenay in her book-length study of Lyotard's consideration of Jewish thought,<sup>9</sup> one that is bound in several ways to Freud. Lyotard's writings on these questions have often been provocative, in particular, his adoption of the nomenclature the "jews"—pluralized, lower-case, and in scare quotes—in an attempt to preempt criticisms of lazy categorization and question the forgotten thought that is presented in forgetting. For some, this attempt to mark thought that resists assimilation, without marking it as only or

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specifically Jewish, provoked an emotive response.<sup>10</sup> Perhaps this was unsurprising given its usage and placement alongside the proper name Heidegger in *Heidegger et les "juifs"* (Heidegger and the "jews"), published in March 1988.

In April 1988 the conference on Hannah Arendt took place against the backdrop of this recent publication, referred to directly by Paul Ricoeur in his contribution, and the wider "Heidegger affair" in France. When Victor Fariás's *Heidegger et le nazisme* appeared in October 1987 it prompted wider discussions in the mainstream press concerning the acceptance of Heidegger's philosophical thought in France and its absorption into contemporary French philosophy in a seemingly unproblematic way. Several philosophical responses followed, including Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, and, subsequently, Lyotard for whom the question was neither the undeniable significance of Heidegger's thought nor the equally unquestionable complicity of his politics during the Nazi era, but his "silence on the extermination of the Jews, a silence observed to the very end by the thinker of Todtnauberg."<sup>11</sup> In his introduction to the English translation, David Carroll notes the wider implications of "the jews" in Lyotard's lexicon, intimating the thought of those writers who strive to resist the tendency to forget, often through their linguistic or geographical displacement. Joyce, Beckett, and Mallarmé are thus described as "non-Irish Irish" and "non-French French," their rejection of a Heideggerian beholding to place echoes Lyotard's own roll call:

Freud, Benjamin, Adorno, Arendt, and Celan—these great non-German Germans, non-Jewish Jews—who not only question but betray the tradition, the *mimēsis*, the immanence of the unfolding, and its root; whom emigration, dispersion, and the impossibility of integration make despair of any return; exhausted by the dual impotence of not changing and changing, of remaining German and becoming French, American [. . .]. Expelled, doomed to exodus. Thus, their hatred of geophilosophy.<sup>12</sup>

The echoes of infancy are strong. Listening to the resounding sounds extend and reverberate beyond the specificity of the named references redoubles their importance. The term "infancy" itself is used in this publication to evoke the unrecognized *affect* of *Nachträglichkeit*: thought for which "we" are unprepared. A voice to which discourse is deaf yet which exerts a presence in spite of initial unpreparedness.



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As we are using chronological proximity of publication as a provisional guiding thread to place Lyotard's *Readings in Infancy* within a wider constellation, there is another displaced forgotten which underlies both this passage and the contemporary scene: Algeria. Lyotard's collection of his accounts and analysis of "the Algerians' war," written for *Socialisme ou barbarie* between 1956 and 1963, were published by Galilée in 1989. They were presented without modification but with a new introduction by Lyotard that speaks of the need to recognize the resistance to "the system" that they represent. Lyotard argues that attempts to deny what was driving the fight that *Socialisme ou barbarie* engaged in "perpetuates the very forgetting of what was actually at stake": the intractable [*l'intraitable*]. At stake is "the idea that there is something within that system that it cannot, in principle *deal with* [*traiter*]. Something that the system must, by virtue of its nature overlook."<sup>13</sup>

Our decision to return "infancy" to the work of Lyotard's reception in English, to turn the focus away from "childhood," makes it necessary to consider Lyotard's infancy in relation to others for whom the term is already associated. Perhaps the most obvious is Giorgio Agamben, whose points of reference and shared philosophical milieu sometimes overlap with Lyotard and yet with whom there is no explicit dialogue.<sup>14</sup> This seeming intellectual proximity makes the following reading a strange one: Agamben's work brings forth aspects of Lyotard's which might less obviously be considered and brings with it a risk of perhaps otherwise unintended associations. Yet this is part of their shared project in allowing writing to suggest, preempt, drive readings elsewhere; as Donna Haraway put it recently in her own generous approach to thinking that she has named tentacular: "an elsewhere and an elsewhere."<sup>15</sup>

Agamben's use of the term "infancy" clusters around *Infancy and History* (1978) and *Literature and Death* (1981) before being absorbed in some ways into considerations of potentiality, for which he has become best known.<sup>16</sup> However, it is the later essay, *Experimentum Linguae* (1988–9), with which we open this short account and where Agamben's description of all books as mere casts, broken casts or molds for the book that remains unwritten, echoes the refusal of finality or fulfillment throughout Lyotard's writing. For Agamben, the unwritten book engenders other works which are not that unwritten book but are themselves the husks of further unrealized—and it would seem unrealizable—projects. This account brings to mind the promised late work that Lyotard referred to on several occasions: a supplement to *The Differend* that would include those aspects which had

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been deliberately left out of *The Differend*: art; the body; sexual difference; questions of space, of time, of color. Mentioned in interviews in the early 1990s, it also appeared as a forthcoming volume to be published by Galilée in the bibliography of *Toward the Postmodern* (1993). Usually, the assumption is that other projects, his illness and early death in 1998 cut short this project, though Lyotard's interest in other unfinished works, such as those collected in Merleau-Ponty's *The Visible and the Invisible* could suggest otherwise. It was left to his widow, Dolorès Lyotard to highlight which of the chapters published in the posthumous collection, *Misère de la philosophie*, had been earmarked for this important work to come. The five chapters so indicated present many parallels with those writings in *Reading in Infancy*, in particular "Emma," the reflection on *Nachträglichkeit* (after-effect) that is anticipated or partnered by "Voices," and the short essay which carries a direct reference to the unrealized book in its published title "The Affect-phrase (from a Supplement to *The Differend*)."

"Affect-phrase" is a dense seven-page, sectioned text which opens with the question from §22 of *The Differend* "Is feeling a phrase?" that takes us directly into territory shared with Agamben.<sup>17</sup> Specifically, the essay *Experimentum Linguae* was written in 1988–9 as the preface to the French edition of *Infancy and History*, published by Payot in 1989 in the series "Critique de la politique," directed by Michel Abensour who had taken over from Lyotard as president of the CIPh in 1985. Both the Lyotard and the Agamben essays reflect and meditate to some extent on the same well-known distinction made by Aristotle in the *Politics* and *De Interpretatione* regarding the particularity of the human as animal endowed with articulated speech and its distinction to voice. In itself this is not remarkable, but it has become one of the most contemplated if controversial considerations of human language: the spoken articulated voice of the human and its relationship or difference to that of the animal. Both writers repeat the importance of *phōnē*, given as the animal voice in Aristotle, as fundamental to considerations of the limitations of language as *logos*. It is in this preface that Agamben gives a clear definition of infancy and, like Lyotard, emphasizes the distinctive etymological roots of *in-fans* (without speech), similarly clarifying that in-fancy is not tied to a particular age or chronological time, nor is it like "a psychosomatic state which a psychology or a paleoanthropology could construct as a human fact independent of language."<sup>18</sup>

For Agamben, it is only through the co-presence of infancy with language that the unsaid or the so-called ineffable is possible; far from indicating the limitations of language, as Wittgenstein would perhaps have us believe in his

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famous final sentence to the *Tractatus*, which is but the “vulgarly ineffable.” In contrast, the concept of infancy for Agamben is an attempt to think through the limits of language “other than that of the vulgarly ineffable.”<sup>19</sup> (The naming of infancy as a concept is Agamben’s and a point of difference with Lyotard, for whom there is nothing so fixed as a concept in his usage of the term that remains as fluid as that to which it gestures.) Agamben claims in *Infancy and History*, “[t]he ineffable is, in reality, infancy,”<sup>20</sup> not the mystical ineffability of language at its supposed limits but that which denies claims made for language as a totality and which denies experience that is not conceived within its bounds. Hence the subtitle to the English translation of *Infancy and History*: “on the destruction of experience.” While taking care not to invoke a nostalgic harking back to a former time, Agamben places the changes in philosophical attitude to experience within a broad historical account, evoking the extent to which the idea of knowledge as separate to experience has been lost. Engendered by modern science and emboldened by a technologically aided empiricism, uncertainty is jettisoned. In contrast, Agamben turns to the celebration of experience as uncertainty in examples from Montaigne and Rousseau. Events where the narrator’s separation from the supposed unified self is recounted and the revelation of the threshold Agamben identifies as infancy occurs. It is described as an in-between or gap that extends the separation between the semantic and semiotic as identified in the writings of Émile Benveniste and reasserts divisions: between Aristotle’s *noûs* (intellect, reason) and *psychê* (soul) or Kant’s distinction between the subject of transcendental apperception and empirical self-consciousness. As Agamben quotes from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, “[t]he subject cannot be cognized.” Agamben is not positing infancy as outside the subject constituted in language, the only way in which the subject can be constituted he holds, but that the primary experience he terms “infancy” “coexists in its origins with language” and only through language is it reachable.<sup>21</sup>

The discussion briefly covers some of the same territory as Lyotard’s *Discourse, Figure* in its desire to show the paucity of discourse without the necessary figural element that drives its thickness. However, it lacks the fundamental disagreement with Jacques Lacan’s acceptance of the necessary dominance of language, in spite of the screen that consciousness places on the unconscious, or the implicit critique of Derrida’s excessive textualism, his propensity to put “language everywhere.”<sup>22</sup> Agamben’s infancy highlights that experience is a knowledge that cannot be spoken of and which is approximated to the *pāthēma* of Aristotle’s animal voice, the

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closed-mouth moaning from which mystery and the linguistic root “mu” is derived. The same etymology is used by Lyotard in both “Affect-phrase” and “Voices”: the mu—of mute, murmur, mutter, the *muttum* from which comes the French word for word, *mot*. The attempts to play with repetitive phonemes in Lyotard’s own writing emphasize the timbre of the voice as carrying with it its infancy, in acknowledgment of the necessary struggle within *lexis* not to disown the *phōnē* that “cannot be broken down into what we call phonemes.”<sup>23</sup> Aristotle says the *phōnē* is inarticulate, able only to signal not signify, to signal affect: pain, pleasure, it is tautegorical to and of itself. As Lyotard remarks, it is “supposedly” inarticulate, but it shows,<sup>24</sup> it *affects*, and in so doing has to be referred to by others as if it were outside the narrating, speaking voice. Only within the terms of discourse is it mute. Lyotard is at pains to ensure that it is not understood as an absolute other, an extrinsic transcendental being, but that it “squats”—infancy inhabits writing. As recalled in the roster of animal figures highlighted in “Voices”: wolves, rats, worms, and cockroaches of Freud, Beckett, Kafka to which we might add the larvae and the spider of Malraux. These are not experiments operating simply to demonstrate the possibilities of writing but glimpses of the infancy that dwells within discourse and to which discourse itself remains deaf.

Agamben, however, seems to dismiss attempts to manifest such infantile undersides. The interior monologues of Joyce’s writings, for example, show nothing of experience but reveal, rather, language itself; neither for Agamben is Freud’s unconscious akin to infancy, revealing rather a non-person, a non-subject with no reality but its own. Yet despite this unwillingness to acknowledge a psychic reality, for fear of implying a pre-subjective or pre-linguistic state, the necessary inability to unify experience brought by infancy is what enables potency (knowledge) and history to exist in the difference and discontinuity that is its basis, born into a world of language with voice but without speech. That is the crux of Agamben’s infancy: “man is not the ‘animal possessing language,’ but instead the animal deprived of language and obliged, therefore, to receive it from outside himself.”<sup>25</sup>

*Lectures d'enfance* has less confidence in its own compartmentalization of experience; within these readings dwell a multiplicity of voices that are not simply demonstrations of the “lucidity” of language, that are not simple negations (non-persons, non-subjects), but readings that rub, touch, flex through their own inability to voice. In so doing the readings in infancy embarked on by Lyotard may sometimes seem to correlate with Agamben in his search for experience that is not singular or closed-off. At times their

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ambitions may seem to overlap; yet the declarations on the predominance of language in Agamben, albeit one acknowledging the infantile, veers toward a control that seems to threaten to find its situation, to place and tether it always to the subject. Such a move might be akin to the inevitable relationship between *phōnē* and *logos* chased in many of Lyotard's writings: how to "link on" without dominating, destroying, and committing an injustice to that which called. But Lyotard warns us: infancy is unable to reply to an articulated sentence. Held hostage, it is unable to put itself into the position of either addressee or addressor, an I/you position, neither does *infans* speak in the sense that might be translated. But it does affect. That affection might not be able to address but once caught, touched, brushed against, yes . . . felt, then it is given voice by the one who responds and hands over the responsibility in turn to respond. In § 11 of "Voices" Lyotard makes an assertion that renders the connection to the infancy of *Heidegger* and "the jews" perhaps more distinct: *phōnē* "traverses generations," it is "an unheard tradition," a voice that is not mine but holds it hostage. The animal voice of *phōnē*. As Élisabeth de Fontenay asks us: Who, for Lyotard, are the victims par excellence of a wrong (*tort*)—divested of the ability to prove the damage to which they are subjected?<sup>26</sup>—Animals, she replies. And to which we might add the unheard animal voices of infancy.

## Notes

24. Maurice Blanchot, *De Kafka à Kafka* (Paris: Gallimard, 1981). The text was initially published as “La voix narrative” in *L'entrelien infini* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), 556–67.
25. Freud, “*L'Homme aux rats*,” 17.
26. Sigmund Freud, *The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire, tr. Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1974), 238.
27. [Beckett uses “Jones” to represent any male person, such as “Joe Blow” in the US or “Joe Bloggs” in the UK; in French, this was *Tartempion*, also used by Lyotard in §26, there rendered as “Jones [Joe Blow]”. —Eds.]
28. Samuel Beckett, *The Unnamable*, tr. Samuel Beckett (New York: Grove, 1958), 26, 69, 72–3.
29. [Lyotard has *wormy* in English in the original. —Eds.]
30. Freud, “Obsessional Neurosis,” 289.
31. Beckett, *The Unnamable*, 130.
32. Freud, “Obsessional Neurosis,” 284.
33. *Ibid.*, 287.
34. *Ibid.*, 209.
35. I follow here the French translation and edition of Aristotle’s *Poetics* by Roselyne Dupont-Roc and Jean Lallot (Paris: Seuil, 1980).
36. [“talking cure” in English in the original. —Eds.]
37. [The *Trauerspiele*, or mourning play, was the subject of Walter Benjamin’s dissertation which drew attention to this minor genre, as commented on by Christine Buci-Glucksmann in her works on the Baroque. See note 32. —Eds.]
38. Cf. Christine Buci-Glucksmann, *Tragique de l'ombre: Shakespeare et le maniérisme* (Paris: Galilée, 1990).
39. [In English in the original. —Trans.]
40. [“Worms” in English in the original. —Eds.]
41. Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method*, tr. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 171–3.

## Afterword

1. Jacques Derrida, *Before the Law: The Complete Text of Préjugés*, tr. Sandra Van Reenen and Jacques de Ville (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2018).
2. See Geoffrey Bennington, “Before.” In Robert Harvey, ed. *Afterwords: Essays in Memory of J-F Lyotard* (New York: Stony Brook, 2000): 7.

## Notes

3. Corinne Enaudeau, “La Politique entre nihilism et histoire.” *Cités* no. 45 (2001): 104 [103–15].
4. Jacques Derrida, “Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce.” In Bernard Benstock, ed. *James Joyce: The Augmented Ninth. Proceedings of the Ninth International James Joyce Symposium* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 27–75.
5. “Return” in this volume, —
6. Christopher Fynsk, “Jean-François’s Infancy.” *Yale French Studies* no. 99 (2001): 44–61.
7. Personal correspondence with Thierry de Duve.
8. See Mary Lydon, “Veduta on *Discours, figure*.” *Yale French Studies* no. 99 (2001): 10–26; Christopher Fynsk, “Jean-François’s Infancy.” In Emine Sarikartal, ed. *Enfances chez Jean-François Lyotard: Sur les traces d’une notion plurielle* (Paris: Université Paris-Nanterre, 2017).
9. Élisabeth de Fontenay, *Une tout autre histoire. Questions à Jean-François Lyotard* (Paris: Fayard, 2006).
10. For a critical consideration and evaluation of the reception of *Heidegger and ‘the jews’*, see Sarah Hammerschlag, “Troping the Jew: Jean-François Lyotard’s *Heidegger and ‘the jews’*.” *Jewish Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (2005): 371–98. For a wide-ranging discussion of both this text and “Prescription: Kafka,” see Jean-François Lyotard, “Before the Law, After the Law, interview with Elisabeth Weber” (1991).
11. Jean-François Lyotard, *Heidegger and ‘the jews’*, (1990): 4.
12. *Ibid.*, 92–3.
13. Jean-François Lyotard, *Political Writings* (1991): 166.
14. Agamben makes direct reference to *The Differend* in *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive* [1998] (New York: Zone, 1999), 34–5, though his presence throughout is more significant as argued by Nicholas Chare, “The Gap in Context: Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Remnants of Auschwitz.’” *Cultural Critique* no. 64 (Autumn 2006): 40–68. See also Robert Harvey, *Witnessness: Beckett, Dante, Levi and the Foundations of Responsibility* (New York and London: Continuum, 2010), 28–9.
15. Donna J. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2016): 32.
16. For a detailed account of the occurrence and usage of the term “infancy” by Agamben, including reference to untranslated writings in Italian, see Leland de la Durantaye, *Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).
17. Jean-François Lyotard, “The Affect-phrase (from a Supplement to *The Differend*.)” *The Lyotard Reader and Guide* (2006): 104 [104–10].
18. Giorgio Agamben, *Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience*, tr. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 2007), 4.

## Notes

19. Ibid., 4.
20. Ibid., 58.
21. Ibid., 55.
22. Jean-François Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure* (2011): 9.
23. “Voices” §7 in this volume, \_\_\_
24. “Voices” §6 in this volume, \_\_\_
25. Agamben, *Infancy and History*, 65.
26. “Entretien avec Élisabeth de Fontenay” with Michèle Cohen-Halimi and Gérard Sfez, *Cahiers philosophiques* no. 117 (April 2009): 106 [99–109].