Dr. Ellen Furnari is a research associate at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, and adjunct faculty at Webster University. Her research focuses on knowledge creation in conflict affected contexts and unarmed civilian peacekeeping. She previously worked with the Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka.

Huibert Oldenhuis is currently the Programme Manager at Nonviolent Peaceforce in Myanmar and holds a masters degree in contemporary history. Previously he has worked as Participatory Peace Education Coordinator with Peace Brigades International in Indonesia, as Associate Expert with the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Nepal, and as a protection field manager with Nonviolent Peaceforce in South Sudan.

Dr. Rachel Julian teaches Peacebuilding, Conflict Resolution, Managing Projects and Critical Perspectives in Peace and War on undergraduate and postgraduate courses at Leeds Metropolitan University. Her research focuses on the development of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping.
Securing Space for Local Peacebuilding:  
The Role of International and National Civilian Peacekeepers

Abstract

While large multilateral peace operations arrive with agendas extending into governance, economics, and other reforms, unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) interventions focus on contributing to sufficiently safe space for local efforts at peacebuilding to proceed, at the request of local partners. They use a variety of nonviolent methods to increase the safety for local leaders and everyday people to engage in (re)building peace infrastructures and governance, within their own culture and contexts. This paper examines the potential for international interveners to support local efforts based on local invitations, local staff, conflict and context analysis, and living in conflict affected communities, followed by a case study of the Nonviolent Peaceforce South Sudan project. This project is helping to revitalize or create community peace infrastructures in coordination with local partners, other peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies, local government, army and other armed actors. This has saved lives, contributed to improved policing, improved relations between ethnic groups, supported local peace actors, and increased the effectiveness of multilateral peace operations and humanitarian aid work focused on physical safety.

Key words: unarmed civilian peacekeeping, peacebuilding, protection, violence prevention, South Sudan

Introduction

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) is a developing practice that combines nonviolence and peacekeeping by which unarmed civilians protect other civilians in areas at risk of, or experiencing, direct political violence. While peacekeeping and peacebuilding are often conceptualised as distinct stages and tasks, this paper discusses the link between them and describes ways in which the practice of UCP contributes to peacebuilding work that is grounded in local communities and follows local leadership. By peacebuilding we mean changes in structural contradictions,
relationships between conflicted parties, and individual attitudes and behaviours, which contribute to a more sustainable, long term absence of direct political violence. There is a growing body of work that discusses the purpose and effectiveness of unarmed civilians protecting individual civilians such as human rights defenders or other community activists, or more broadly focused on providing protection to whole communities or groups within a community. Though not connected to the literature on unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) referred to above, there is also growing attention paid to the challenges of protecting civilians, and to the ways in which civilians in the midst of armed conflicts, protect themselves.

Recently there has been increased much less attention to the connections between peacekeeping of any sort and in particular, that which is oriented to protection of civilians, and the work of peacemaking and peacebuilding, focused on the challenges posed by the increasing complexity of peace operations that include both aspects in their mandates, though Carriere is one of the few who addresses the

The connection between UCP as peacekeeping and peacebuilding is an exception. This paper attempts to weave these strands together, discussing and then demonstrating the ways in which UCP effectively protects civilians, augmenting their own protection strategies when possible, while simultaneously increasing safety for and supporting local peacebuilding work, some of which may grow out of these self-protection efforts. In light of Paffenholz' work which critiques the support by international interveners of urban based, specialised NGOs in as the primary peacebuilding strategies, finding ways to effectively support grassroots, rural, community rooted peacebuilding is particularly crucial.

The paper begins with a definition and brief explanation of UCP and its foundations. This is followed by a discussion of some of the ways in which peacekeeping links to peacebuilding, highlighting interrelationships and the challenges these pose for both peacekeeping and peacebuilding. While the use of these concepts is designed to highlight the differences between tasks, for different actors in various stages and levels of peace processes, in this paper we highlight the ways in which each set of tasks sets the context for and overlaps with other tasks. This is followed by a section which details how the strengths of UCP contribute to a context which is conducive to peacebuilding, as well as contributing to peacebuilding efforts directly. Finally the paper describes ongoing work by the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) in South Sudan, demonstrating the implementation of UCP and the connection between peacekeeping and peacebuilding in this particular context.

What is Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping?

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) is the practice of deploying unarmed civilians before,
during, and after violent conflict, to prevent or reduce violence, to provide direct physical protection to other civilians, and to strengthen or build resilient local peace infrastructures. The purpose of UCP is to create a safer environment, or a ‘safer space’, for civilians to address their own needs, solve their own conflicts, and protect vulnerable individuals and populations in their midst. This ‘safer space’ is created through a strategic mix of key nonviolent engagement methods, principles, values, and skills (see figure 1). These efforts aim to influence potential perpetrators of violence to desist while supporting local actors to engage in peacebuilding as well as resume regular activities that may have been suspended out of fear.

Figure 1: The spectrum of UCP (source: Oldenhuis et al, forthcoming)

Scholars and practitioners have used different terms to describe the concept of UCP, such as proactive presence, protective accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection, and included different components in their definitions of UCP. Though there may be subtle differences between the theories that lie behind the various definitions and terms as well as in the scope of methods that are covered by these terms, the respective practices share similarities.

10 Huibert Oldenhuis, Rolf Carriere, Ellen Furnari, Mel Duncan, ‘Strengthening Civilian Capacities to Protect Civilians from Violence: E-Learning Course’, (UNITAR and Nonviolent Peaceforce, forthcoming).


Though most attempts of defining and institutionalising UCP are of western origin and recent date, unarmed or nonviolent methods to interrupt violence and protect civilians can be found in many cultures throughout history.¹⁴

Since Peace Brigades International (PBI) began fielding unarmed international staff to protect nonviolent civilian activists in Central America in the mid 1980s,¹⁵ a number of international nongovernmental organizations, such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Witness for Peace,¹⁶ and Nonviolent Peaceforce have provided UCP in conflict areas around the world. The United Nations has increasingly recognized the value of UCP and some of its offices, such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal, have effectively engaged in UCP type efforts and prevented violence through the physical presence and engagement of unarmed civilian field staff.¹⁷ Recent research and evaluation suggests that UCP has had positive impacts in a number of projects.¹⁸ These impacts have included, among many: influencing armed actors to desist from harming civilians in particular contexts; supporting local civilian efforts to prevent violence and protect themselves through the creation of security meetings, peace committees, women’s peace teams; contributing to peace negotiations at the community and regional levels; and expanding the safety for local activists to engage in human rights and peace promoting activities.

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeepers (UCPs) engage with affected communities at the grassroots level for extended periods of time. They provide, for example, protective accompaniment or presence

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¹⁴ Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber, Nonviolent Intervention across Borders; Schirch, Civilian Peacekeeping: Preventing Violence; Gorur, Community Self-Protection Strategies.

¹⁵ Mahony and Eguren, Unarmed Bodyguards.


to threatened human rights defenders, Internally Displaced People (IDPs), or returnees. Their physical presence is usually provided for weeks, months and even years. Depending on the need, it may be at certain times and places, or all day and night in extreme threat contexts. It may be provided twenty-four hours, seven days a week, for several weeks or even months. UCPs can also employ a range of other methods, such as ceasefire monitoring, rumour control, conflict mitigation, and capacity development. UCP is applicable at various stages of a conflict; during early stages to prevent violence and protect those working for nonviolent conflict, during crisis situations to stop violence, de-escalate tensions and protect civilians, and at later stages to help sustain peace agreements and secure a safer space for peacebuilding. UCP has also contributed to national and international efforts to influence armed actors and negotiate peace.

Not all contexts are equally suitable for UCP. The effectiveness of UCP highly depends on its ability to create acceptance among local actors and engage with these actors as a visible, nonpartisan presence. In places where such a presence is rejected (by the host government, non-state armed actors, or affected communities) or specifically targeted by armed groups, it is difficult, not appropriate, or simply not possible for UCP to operate or be effective. For instance members of a Christian Peacemaker Team in Baghdad were abducted and one killed, and the team withdrew. Similarly due to the levels of threat of abduction, the Nonviolent Peaceforce in Mindanao had only a small team of national staff in some regions of Mindanao, visited regularly by international staff who did not live there. That said, UCP interventions have been effective in many different contexts ranging from the civil wars in Guatemala, Mindanao Philippines, and Aceh Indonesia, to the current context of South Sudan, which is both post civil war and independence and currently as of this writing experiencing a new civil war.

The role of UCP in Securing Space for Local Peacebuilding

In this section we first discuss several ways in which peacekeeping is linked to both peacemaking and peacebuilding, and the implications of these interrelationships. After describing a number of concerns which arise from recognising this interrelationship, we describe how the particular

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strengths of UCP can address these concerns and contribute positively not only to peacekeeping, but also peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks.

As defined above, UCP works to prevent violence, protect people AND contribute to the strengthening or emergence of local work that will contribute to nonviolent political contestation. These goals are shared with military peacekeeping or multidimensional peacekeeping. We argue here, however, that UCP, in many contexts, can play a particularly useful role in bridging peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. While sometimes referred to as three different stages or three different sets of tasks (see Galtung and Bhutros-Ghali 20) it is apparent that there are actually strong links between these different sets of tasks, and that their implementation overlaps. For instance, Francis notes that including only, or giving primacy to armed groups in peace negotiations, often excludes nonviolent actors and the general public. This may have a somewhat perverse effect, encouraging actors to engage in political violence in order to be included, making peacekeeping and peacebuilding more challenging and the exclusion of many parts of society has long term ramifications for developing a lasting peace. Johnstone suggests that while consent may be initially given (and at times under significant pressure), it must be maintained throughout the long peacekeeping and peacebuilding periods, and that it must ultimately have the consent of the wider public and not just the initial signatories. Thus it is clear that the process of peace negotiations, i.e. who is included and excluded in peacemaking as well as the provisions of any peace agreement, sets the context for peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Similarly, we argue that the ability of a peacekeeping intervention to successfully prevent further violence, will impact both further peace negotiations and the potential to build a more sustainable peace through various peacebuilding efforts. Localized outbreaks of violence following a peace agreement can instigate widespread violence and undermine further peacemaking.

19 The authors assume that the goal of peacebuilding is nonviolent political contestation, with sufficient safety for civilians to participate as fully as they choose, rather than envisioning an end to political conflict.
21 Diana Francis, From Pacification to Peacebuilding a Call to Global Transformation, (London: Pluto Press, 2010).
agreements are often negotiated without all relevant actors included they may not address critical conflicts which are obstacles to peacebuilding and which fuel continuing cycles of violence. At the same time, ongoing violence undermines efforts to (re)build peace infrastructures, connections across divides, and address underlying drivers of conflict, all of which are essential aspects of peacebuilding or as 'peace writ large'.24 There needs to be sufficient safety for civilians to engage in peacebuilding efforts without risking death or disappearance. Closing the circle, we argue that successful peacebuilding efforts which build connections, processes and which effectively address some or all of the underlying contributors to conflict, support implementation of agreements made through further peace settlements within peacemaking and a context in which local people cooperate with peacekeeping. Peacebuilding efforts implemented at the national level or in one particular region may positively influence peacemaking efforts at the local level (and vice versa) or in a different region. In other words, while it may be useful to conceptualize these as three different stages or sets of tasks, they are interrelated, may happen simultaneously at different levels and are factors in success overall.

It follows that if peacekeeping is not effective at preventing violence and protecting people, a return to more overt, active political violence including a return to war, is more likely. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, in the period between 1975 and 2011, only 125 peace agreements out of 216 were followed by the termination of violence for at least five years.25 This shows there is room for improvement in making a successful transition from peacemaking to peacebuilding and raises questions about the role of peacekeeping in accompanying and aiding this transition.

As argued above, peacekeeping plays a central role in supporting peacemaking efforts and contributing to a safe enough context for peacebuilding. This suggests a number of issues which we note here briefly, and then discuss how UCP relates to them. Summarizing the


implications of the above discussion suggests the following propositions: peacekeeping is an essential link between peacemaking and peacebuilding; the absence or inadequacy of peacekeeping may hamper or stall peacebuilding and development efforts; protection has been under-emphasized within the practice of peacebuilding, while unarmed or nonviolent methods have been under-emphasized within the practice of peacekeeping. Additionally, though peacebuilding and peacekeeping are theoretically, and in many instances separate practices for foreign experts, reality on the ground is more complex or fluid. The practice of providing protection, security, and conflict resolution often occurs simultaneously or overlaps (e.g., in order to negotiate about security, relations need to be built). The local actors involved in these practices are often the same people, who don’t differentiate their actions as peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding. UCP recognizes this reality and plays a role in protecting and nurturing these local ‘peacebuilding’ efforts and local ‘peacebuilders’ in the bud. It doesn’t simply create security and when the situation is deemed stable hands over the keys to others. Its approach to security and protection is in a way peacebuilding as interventions are tailored to the context and needs of the people. This makes it an extremely valuable form of peacekeeping, from a peacebuilding perspective.

a) Peacekeeping (armed and unarmed) is an essential link between peacemaking and peacebuilding as it creates the security and stability needed to implement peace agreements, address root causes, and rebuild relations = peacekeeping is relevant for peacebuilding.

b) Lack of or insufficient peacekeeping may hamper or stall peacebuilding and development efforts = effective and timely peacebuilding depends to some extent on effective peacekeeping.

c) Protection has been under-emphasized within the practice of peacebuilding, while unarmed or nonviolent methods have been under-emphasized within the practice of peacekeeping = there is a need for more synergy between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.


27 Carriere, Another Peace is Possible.

d) Peacebuilding and peacekeeping are separate practices in theory and to some extent in practice for foreign experts, however the reality on the ground is more complex or fluid. The practice of providing protection, security, and conflict resolution often occurs simultaneously or overlaps (e.g. in order to negotiate about security, relations need to be built). The local actors involved in these practices are often the same people, who don’t differentiate their actions as peacemaking or peacebuilding (unlike foreign experts) — peacebuilding is already practiced by local actors at the crisis/peacekeeping (and peace making) stage even though it may not be considered peacebuilding and external peacebuilding efforts may not yet be launched.

UCP recognizes this reality and plays a role in protecting and nurturing these local ‘peacebuilding’ efforts and local ‘peacebuilders’ in the bud. It doesn’t simply create security and when the situation is deemed stable hands over the keys to the peacebuilders. Its approach to security and protection is in a way peacebuilding. It can be used before, during and after a violent situation, and tailor its peacekeeping interventions to the context and needs of the people — UCP is an ideal kind of peacekeeping from a peacebuilding perspective.

UCP accomplishes these interventions through specific methodologies, which express the key principles of nonpartisanship (though as previously noted, not all organizations espouse nonpartisanship), independence, civilian to civilian partnerships, and nonviolence. Developing good relationships is one of the keys to effective peacekeeping generally and UCP in particular.  

UCP relies on building good working relationships with all sectors of society in the areas where they work. The opportunity to build good relationships is enhanced by local perceptions of UCP interventions being nonpartisan, unarmed and therefore not a direct threat, and generally independent of any specific national or international agendas. These relationships are used not

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30 Ellen Furnari, ‘Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping: A Potential Response to Peacekeepers’ and Critical Scholars’ Parallel Critiques of Multidimensional Peace Operations?’ (paper presented at the International Humanitarian
only for direct protection work but also to help connect different sectors of society and promote understanding/communication between track three and track two or track one\textsuperscript{31} as well as with other international interveners. Thus, although the work is focused on preventing violence and protecting civilians, which are seen as peacekeeping tasks, the strong grounding in local communities and with local actors across sectors means that the work of UCP contributes at times to both peacemaking and peacebuilding. For instance, in Mindanao, Philippines, unarmed civilian peacekeepers of Nonviolent Peaceforce were part of an international monitoring team and a member of the civilian protection component. In this capacity UCPs helped to link local community concerns and experiences to the peace negotiations. At the same time, by supporting the creation of local security meetings inclusive of civilian leaders as well as police and military, the project contributed to changes in the provision of community security.

As UCPs develop strong relationships across sectors, people begin to turn to them with concerns. When news spreads of a violent attack or abduction, UCPs may be well positioned to investigate and either provide rumour control or early warning/early response planning in the case of looming violence. Doing this effectively requires a broad network of connections, built up over time, and reflecting that UCPs live in the communities where they work and are easily accessible. Though not all UCP interventions include local staff, those that do, rely on their local knowledge to help understand the situation. Additionally UCPs are sometimes able to travel in places where others do not or cannot go. UCP security protocols generally allow using transportation such as motorbikes or walking, in order to reach remote areas unreachable otherwise. When local people are included in the staff as UCPs (not just drivers or in administrative positions), attempts are usually made to ensure that local staff come from various ethnicities, regions or in other words from different ‘sides’ of the conflict. Thus there is often a perception of inclusivity, which not only promotes trust by different sectors, but also models cooperation across divides, which in and of itself contributes to peacebuilding.

In contrast, currently peacekeeping currently undertaken by the UN, EU, AU or others is generally only one dimension of multidimensional peacekeeping operations.32 While the peacekeeping (as opposed to peace enforcement) is generally oriented toward supporting a negotiated peace agreement, most missions today are also tasked with protecting civilians. Other dimensions may address democratic elections, constitutional and security sector reforms and other efforts to strengthen governance, various humanitarian and development components, as well as economic reforms oriented toward supporting free markets. This combination of dimensions is frequently referred to as the liberal peace agenda,33 and is often described as related to the assumption that liberal democracies do not fight each other.34 This leads toward programming to establish a world of liberal democracies with free markets as the path to world peace and an argument that non-liberal governance is a security issue for existing liberal democracies.35 These various components and the liberal peace agenda itself, make up much of what is oriented toward peacebuilding, rather than peacekeeping, within multidimensional operations. Others argue that this analysis obscures any indications of neo-colonialism, capitalist exploitation, and manifestation of self-serving great powers, which may influence the construction of these interventions.36 Francis believes that this combination of pre-packaged agendas, implemented by outside experts, often through the domination of military force in peacekeeping (or peace enforcement) roles, has undermined the legitimacy of the concept of peacebuilding itself.37

37 Francis, From Pacification to Peacebuilding.
Unlike UCP interventions, the military and police components that engage directly in work to maintain a peace agreement, often are charged with supporting the government. They tend to live in military compounds, disconnected from nearby communities, with restricted rules of interaction with the community. The stereotyped image is of peacekeepers in UN vehicles roaring through villages, creating disturbances rather than relationships which would be core for the assigned tasks (see Pouligny). All these factors may compromise the positive impact of peacekeeping on peacebuilding.

UCP interventions generally do not engage with the liberal peace agenda and related models of peacebuilding. Multidimensional peacekeeping undertaken by multilateral organisations in relationship to governments and other armed actors, have several layers of military and civilian staff before reaching local civilians with programming shaped by the liberal agenda. In contrast UCP interventions operate within the principle of independence and civilian to civilian partnerships. They are also directly grounded in relationships with local people, independent, nonpartisan, and not connected to wider international agendas. As staff are unarmed, they are not involved in military domination. Staff may provide protection and input to humanitarian agencies which are part of or related to other agendas, but attempt to do so in a way centred on which keeps the needs of local people front and centre. UCP interventions in other words, are rarely implicated in the liberal peace agenda and thus tend not to be effected by the resistance which may be catalysed in response. UCP interventions support local efforts toward peace both by contributing to safer environments in which local people can do peacebuilding work as well as by providing training, security related dialogues and such that contribute to peacebuilding. UCP projects may connect local level civilians to other individuals and agencies, which can strengthen the local work. UCPs bring their knowledge and expertise to support the (re)building of peace infrastructures at the local level, which may contribute to efforts at the regional and national levels as well.

This has direct implications for peacebuilding and peace builders. UCP contributes to keeping local peacemakers and human rights defenders alive, so that these actors can play a role later on.

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in solidifying peace and promoting reconciliation. It builds their capacity and confidence, making it more likely that they will be involved in (effective) long-term peacebuilding efforts. UCP is oriented toward increasing local expertise, rather than bringing in outside experts, though it shares knowledge freely. UCP builds or strengthens local self-sustaining structures for the sake of security and protection, which may well be used for reconciliation and conflict transformation as well. UCP has a nonviolent approach to security and protection, using acceptance and relationship building instead of walls and guns. Not only does this prepare the ground for peacebuilding efforts and structures, which are founded on the same values and principles, but it also shows local actors that guns and force can be pushed back even further than often thought. It questions the notion of peace enforcement, interrupts the cycle of violence, and links means and ends.

In situations of increasing stability, UCP is well positioned to facilitate a transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. This has a lot to do with its approach to security. Relying on the use of force, military protection actors often create security spaces with sharp boundaries, for example by cutting off any contacts between civilians in a ‘safe zone’ and armed factions in a ‘red zone’ soldiers may act as a physical buffer between conflicting groups or coerce perpetrators to halt their attack. In doing so, they create safety from armed actors. This may be chosen in certain situations, but it also risks disconnecting people from each other and interfering with self-protection and survival strategies of communities. Instead, UCPs obtain their own security (and that of the people they protect) through maintaining relationships of trust and acceptance with all conflicting parties. UCPs They cultivate trust and acceptance with all conflict parties, so as to create spaces or situations, in which civilians can experience safety with members of other groups, including armed actors. By cultivating such spaces, they may become foci or ‘mediative spaces’ where conflicting parties can restore relations and begin to address the root causes of conflict.

Finally, UCP encourages local participation in peacekeeping and by doing so strengthens the foundations of peacebuilding. Local actors, especially civilians, are often excluded from

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peacekeeping or security matters, unlike peacebuilding, which is more entrusted to local actors. As peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are highly interrelated processes at the field level, the relative exclusion of civilians, especially women, in peacekeeping and security processes, may undermine potential peacebuilding opportunities. Women may have different perspectives and priorities about security than men, which are often ignored and may result in insecurity that can be prevented. UCP often facilitates ongoing dialogue between security actors and women to identify and include their perspectives and priorities. Moreover, UCP may employ these women as peacekeepers or support them in establishing local peacekeeping units. These local peacekeepers often continue to keep and build peace after international peacekeepers have left the area and when security concerns are gradually replaced by the need for conflict transformation and reconciliation.

UCP in Action: Nonviolent Peaceforce South Sudan

In this section we illustrate how UCP can secure space for local peacebuilding by examining two examples of the efforts of Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) in South Sudan. We will examine these efforts in relationship to the three dimensions of peacebuilding that we identified in the introduction of this paper; improving relationships between conflicted parties, changing individual attitudes and behaviours, and altering structural contradictions.

The NP project in South Sudan began in 2010, in the lead up to the vote for independence, which took place in 2011. Beginning with a small team in one area (Mundri in Western Equatoria), by mid 2014 NP had approximately 450 international and 40 national staff working directly as peacekeepers in the field, spread out over ten teams. Field locations in mid 2014 included the following states: Central Equatoria State, Unity State, Jonglei State, Lakes State, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal. The project works with and through local structures, traditional authorities and where present, local organisations. The main programme areas in 2014 included direct protection,

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41 Personal communication with staff August, 2014.

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Facilitating a Peace Agreement in Western Equatoria State

Improving relations between conflict parties is an important dimension of peacebuilding as it reduces the long lasting effects of war-related hostilities and disrupted communication between the conflict parties. Improved relationships across divides can change attitudes and in particular behaviours of different groups toward each other, while at the same time helping to create or renew security related structures or processes which help minimize local, inter/intra communal contradictions. Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) has done this in many different ways in South Sudan.

NP’s initial focus in South Sudan was on supporting efforts aimed at rebuilding connections between communities and ethnic groups locked in cycles of revenge during the long civil war with Sudan, which would lead to decreased violence against civilians. These efforts addressed both the need for creating sufficient safety for civilians to engage with each other, and providing various kinds of supports as needed, to these efforts. For example in 2011, shortly after their initial team arrived, NP was asked to intervene in a conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists. Fighting erupted after a youth was killed in a particular county of Western Equatoria State and soon spread into a neighbouring county of Lakes State. Groups of youth from both sides were moving along state borders and violently attacking communities from the other side. Large-scale destruction of property and attacks on civilians ensued: between 9 February and 3 April 2011, over 6,000 homes were burned down, over 76,000 people were displaced, dozens of civilians including children were killed or injured, and hundreds of cattle and goats were raided. A team of NP staff, consisting of four expatriates and six nationals, was able to reach the remote area and bring the paramount chiefs...
and other key community leaders together for discussions. With facilitation and patience over many months, the chiefs negotiated an agreement that would prevent further violence.

While this can be seen as a relatively small impact, local people perceived it as deeply significant. In the past, different ethnic groups had been able to negotiate these differences with little or small scale violence. But the civil war (between north and south Sudan) had eroded traditional structures and the proliferation of guns meant that any violence tended to be lethal. Additionally, the intervention both modelled the possibility of settling differences non-violently and reminded people of their traditions to do so. It was a beginning of a new historical phase, after the many years of conflict during and after the civil war. The Deputy Governor of Western Equatoria State in South Sudan, Sapana Abuyi, stated in 2012: ‘There have been no conflicts since September. Usually the conflicts are in the dry season between September and April. This has been a 100% success. I give the credit to Nonviolent Peaceforce.’

What remains hidden from view, reading this brief account, are the efforts that led to this outcome as well as the efforts to maintain it. If NP had not already been based in the area and built a network of relations with various actors, it would not have been asked to intervene nor able to intervene quickly and effectively, if they could have intervened at all. If NP had not made additional efforts to build equal relationships on both sides, they could easily have been perceived as partisan and ignored by one side or, worse, attacked. Because NP had an office in Western Equatoria State, but not in Lakes State, home of the other conflicting parties, the team undertook several trips to Lakes State to build relationships with communities and government officials. After a long process of preparing the ground for intervention, NP endeavoured for months to create a conducive environment for local parties to reach an agreement. They also provided a constant protective presence within the affected communities, coordinated and participated in peace conferences, provided transportation when needed for others to attend, engaged with members of the national legislative assembly in the capital city to gain support from high-level government officials, and accompanied community leaders to peace talks. When a peace agreement was finally reached, NP continued its efforts to inform communities about the

43 Oldenhuis et al., Strengthening Civilian Capacities.
agreement, monitor the implementation of the agreement, and facilitated the resolution of conflicts over (alleged) breaches of the agreement. Ultimately it required NP to engage in 115 separate interventions between February and September 2011 before the situation was deemed sufficiently stable.

The case shows the fluidity between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding as well as the central role of relationship building in the process towards peace and stability. As local peacemakers were members of one side or the other, some of them were afraid to travel to territory controlled by the other side. The peacekeepers of NP provided protection through accompaniment to local peacemakers, which increased their confidence and security and allowed them to engage with the other side. They also provided protective presence during peace negotiations and to affected communities in the area, preventing further displacement. Thus, instead of creating separate security zones, where civilians from one side enjoy security from the other side, NP created a mediative space where both sides could enjoy security with each other and start the process of (re)building trust and relationships. As these relationships improved, attitudes and behaviours changed. The discussions and dialogues with people from many different social sectors not only built relationships, but also helped to create new processes, which at least began to address some of the underlying contradictions of land use, ethnicity, and political power.

As UCPs use a fairly broad range of methods, including protection and conflict mitigation, they are well placed to operate in the spaces between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. In most conflict areas, periods of crisis are followed by periods of relative calm and vice versa, which requires a flexibility of methods and strategies. Moreover, there is often not enough interaction between military security actors on the one hand and peacebuilding experts on the other. This easily creates a disconnect in the peace process and ignores its fluidity. Military peacekeepers have been urged to seek connections with civilian organizations involved with self-protection and actively seek opportunities to bring stakeholders into contact with each other. UCP can play a role in building relationships between these two groups. In the case of Western

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45 Levine, Some Moral Considerations, 18.
Equatoria, NP built relationships with the police and the military, in particular with a unit of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), called the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU). The JIU, deployed to the area to bring the situation under control, had a difficult time engaging with the various parties as they were sent out to cover two states with one vehicle and no communication equipment. NP made an effort to include them in the process and as NP’s Country Director stated ‘they were one of the most genuine group of soldiers we had ever worked with and they were eager to be agents of peace…’. The inclusion of soldiers and other actors that are ‘hard to reach’ is often too easily ignored in peace projects, but it has proven to be an important factor of effectiveness.

The case also shows the necessity for sustained peacekeeping efforts at the field level. Building relationships and trust between conflicting parties is a difficult process that takes time and ongoing nurturing. The fact that 115 interventions were necessary to create, cement, and implement the peace agreement clearly shows this. Needless to say that these interventions could not have been made if NP had been operating from the capital city, had protocols that limited their presence in or transportation to local communities, or if NP had ended its presence and engagement at the field level after the conclusion of the peace agreement. As UCP is grounded in the notion that local actors should be the main drivers of change, these sustained peacekeeping efforts can at times take the form of very basic actions, such as driving a local chief across muddy roads to a distant village so that he can address issues relevant to the peace process. Though this may not appear a good use of time and resources to some or beneath the dignity of others, these seemingly insignificant efforts can be instrumental. A simple journey to a distant village, when the vehicle gets stuck in the mud and UCPs (men and women from various parts of the world) and chiefs are getting themselves dirty to pull it out together, can do more for relationships building than a whole series of formal meetings in distinguished offices.

Addressing these local conflicts is critical, both for affected communities as for the wider context. While the violence that broke out in December 2013 in South Sudan was instigated by national figures with national political agendas, it is can be fed at the local level by local conflicts, resentments and retaliations for past violence. Re-establishing connections and communication

46 Oldenhuis et al., Strengthening Civilian Capacities.
47 Anderson and Olson, Confronting War.
thus may have a longer term impact, in terms of at least preventing further deterioration of relationships and violent behaviours. While there are many factors affecting which regions of South Sudan are currently (at the time of this writing) experiencing high levels of political violence, it is telling to note that the areas such as this, where NP helped to address underlying conflicts, have not flared up. Providing a follow up summary in July 2014 the NP country director in South Sudan wrote:

We have continued to monitor the progress of the communities each migration season and have paid visits on both sides of the border since then to check in and see how things are going and offer support where needed. There have been a couple of very minor incidents but no major conflict and as far as we know, no deaths since this agreement was made. This year the situation in that area is much more tense as the displacement from Jonglei has pushed into Lakes and across the border into Western Equatoria where the communities reported a higher than usual amount of cattle keepers and their cattle and that they were all heavily armed. We dispatched the Nzara based team to the area a number of times over the past 6 months and they have conducted a couple of community dialogues to help the affected populations think through their options. Tensions have been further escalated by defection and the movement of armed actors in the area. The governor has done an admirable job of diffusing the big issues, and has issued an order for the cattle keepers to pull out which we heard today has started to happen. So in summary, the situation that we dealt with at the time has not repeated itself, the communities have been quite proactive about de-escalation and nonviolent problem solving. The impact of the bigger conflict has been felt but it has not deteriorated and there is generally a strong commitment to preventing outbreaks of violence.48

Facilitating Community Security Meetings in Pibor

**Facilitating Community Security Meetings in Pibor**

Altering structural contradictions is widely regarded as essential for lasting peace. Many peacebuilding efforts aim to reform structures that fuel or reproduce conflict, or create structures that manage conflict and its grievances in a constructive way. NP works to (re)build peace infrastructures… which are two different things…. So I have suggested a new beginning sentence.

48 Personal communication, August 2014.
infrastructures that contribute to safer environments for civilians. One of the most basic structures NP has worked to establish in South Sudan are community security meetings. In isolated areas communities often lack information about security issues and rumours of an imminent attack on the community, or direct violence in the area easily cause panic and displacement. At the same time there are numerous civilian protection needs. However, official and informal contact between civilians and protection actors (government, police, military, UN peacekeepers, INGO security officers) is often limited. Under these circumstances and in communities where they work, NP organizes regular community security meetings to bring protection actors and the community together in a safe space to exchange information and address concerns. Though NP may initiate these meetings, ownership of the meetings is gradually moved towards local actors. In some cases the meetings are used to address other urgent concerns not directly related to security.

For civilians, community security meetings can be an opportunity to obtain information about the situation from various security actors, express security concerns, and develop solutions to issues related to safety and security. For protection actors it is an opportunity to engage in rumour control, increase community awareness of specific issues, and assess the perceptions of the community about security. Conversely, such relationships also have the potential to increase protection actors’ inclination and ability to fulfil their responsibilities as the people they are mandated to protect become known colleagues. As UCPs will eventually leave, these relationships are in some ways more important than the relationships UCPs have with local actors. For NP it has been an opportunity to strengthen the relationships between civilians and protection actors and change certain attitudes and behaviour, i.e. giving civilians the confidence, courage, and knowledge necessary to approach the military, police, government officials, and UN peacekeepers when future threats arise. It is also a reminder that international actors are present and attending to security related events. Conversely, such relationships also have the potential to increase protection actors’ inclination and ability to fulfil their responsibilities as the people they are mandated to protect become known colleagues. As UCPs will eventually leave, these relationships are in some ways more important than the relationships UCPs have with local actors. Though community security meetings may be held regularly and help to build relationships and increase

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49 The following material is drawn from Oldenhuis et al (2014).
collaboration between communities and security actors, this usually is a long process that needs to be supported and nurtured.

In certain areas NP has organised separate security meetings for women only. Women are often excluded when it comes to security matters. And even if included, they are, they often will not voice specific security concerns (or raise their voice at all). In Pibor, for example, NP was told that in a previous attack on the community many women and children ran into a river and drowned. NP staff noticed that husbands told their wives to stay at home to watch their children during the community security meeting, so that the men could attend. NP responded by organizing separate security meetings at different times to give the women an opportunity to engage directly and more freely with security actors. For that particular group of women, it was the first time anyone had ever engaged them in such a way. Not only did this build the confidence of the women, it also helped to change the attitudes of some of the men as they witnessed that the views and concerns of women were taken seriously by the women and men of NP and the UN.

Some of the women experienced sexual violence by ill-disciplined South Sudanese soldiers (about eighteen to twenty cases of rape per month), mostly when they were collecting water. However, they would not raise this issue in community security meetings with men as it was a taboo subject. It took NP staff a lot of trust building before women would speak to them individually about such issues. When NP talked with UN peacekeepers, explaining the situation to them, the peacekeepers eventually decided to collect their own water at the borehole where women were harassed most frequently. They would go there as another way to boost their presence. NP received feedback from the South Sudanese soldiers who commented they knew why NP had helped to organise these arrangements. The soldiers indicated they were a bit frustrated, but they moved on, and they’ve been leaving the women alone.

Though the concerns over sexual violence were not initially voiced directly in the security meetings, the meetings became a space where these and other community concerns could be addressed with a diverse group of security actors. In Pibor NP worked together with UN peacekeepers on the ground, UNPOL, and the national police service to set up a system where they
would jointly patrol areas that the community had indicated were ‘insecure’. UNPOL, the UN peacekeepers, and the NP team took turns throughout the day, morning, afternoon, and evening, to conduct patrols in these areas. An emergency phone tree was also established and distributed among the key actors in the area. Furthermore, NP worked together with women to strengthen self-protection strategies, such as accompanying each other or collecting water in large groups at specific times. Over a six to eight week period of doing these patrols and implementing these strategies, the number of reported rapes per week dropped from four or five to zero, as did other forms of violence that had been committed by soldiers in the area. These processes began to change the attitudes of the women and others, about their proper role, build new relationships, and address some of the structural conditions which put women and men at risk. According to the team leader of NP project in Pibor:

Patrolling in Kandako was one of the most effective things we did. It not only made civilians feel safer, I believe it actually made them safer as well. We started patrolling in March 2012 one week after a civilian was killed in the area. In the eight months that we were patrolling no civilians were shot. Two days after NP’s forced evacuation from Pibor County in October 2012 three people got shot. One of them died.50

The case shows that the establishment of very basic structures such as regular community security meetings can achieve multiple outcomes, such as increasing the security in the area, building relations between community members and security actors, changing attitudes of community members towards security actors and vice versa, increasing collaboration between different security actors, and the creation of additional structures such as the joint-patrol system. The security meetings also became a stepping stone for capacity building on self-protection strategies and dialogue on other issues that the women considered urgent. It remains to be seen whether the newly built structures can or will be reinvigorated in Pibor. The project hopes to return there to contribute to recent local and regional peace efforts, which they previously supported, in the near future.51

50 Unpublished Nonviolent Peaceforce document shared with authors.
51 Personal communication, August 2014.
It is important to note that in many communities, there is already peace work going on, and UCPs support this work by increasing the circumstances in which these activists can work. In some areas the community security meetings led to the creation of women peacekeeping teams, as some of the women participating in these meetings are already engaged in what might be termed peacebuilding work. For example in another community one example a number of women who had been active in their communities, working to prevent violence and promote peace, were engaged in various short term dialogue programs promoted by international agencies active in their region. They were frustrated by the lack of changes in the actual attitudes and behaviours, and the continued direct violence. They approached the local NP team and in discussions they came up with a plan to engage local youth directly. These youth had been involved in the political violence, making it difficult for community members from different ethnic groups to do their everyday tasks. NP staff accompanied the women in their initial visits to talk with these young men, increasing their security and simultaneously providing transportation. This engagement with specific perpetrators of violence against civilians was beginning to bear fruit, and violence in the community was decreasing. However, similarly to situation in Pibor, with the dramatic increase in direct violence in the area (related to renewed civil war), as well as changes in local officials, it has been hard to sustain this work. Still it shows promise for impact in a future time, when there is greater safety to engage in peacebuilding, as the women are rooted in their communities and committed to making changes.

Even without a return to war or high levels of political violence, UCP interventions face many challenges to creating relationships and structures that can productively protect civilians, prevent violence, and support local peace efforts. In South Sudan the government and paramount chiefs change regularly, as do international peacekeepers (who often serve in six month rotations) and international aid workers. As a result, relationships must frequently be built anew and beginning structural positive changes may be undone as people with new attitudes and behaviours arrive. Without sufficient local grounding in conditions and knowledge of actual local actors, funding may be provided by international funders with unrealistic timeframes and for activities that are at best ineffective and at worst actually undermine the work. An organized local civil society might be able to provide the necessary continuity to hold structures together, maintain relationships with
institutions even though its representatives have changed, and elaborate on strategies that have been tried before, but in South Sudan it is often weak or absent. Though informal structures of some sort can always be found, it pushes UCPs often further into assuming a leadership position than they would like, challenging their principles of being nonpartisan and giving primacy to local actors.

Conclusion

While conceptually useful for analysing different actors and phases to building sustainable peace, there is clearly an interrelationship and overlap between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. While efforts to make peace generally precede peacekeeping interventions, these peacemaking moments may actually be followed by a new cycle of violence. Thus peacekeepers fielded after a peace agreement has been signed often contend with direct political violence between armed actors and directed toward civilians. How peacekeepers respond to these periods of violence will impact further peacemaking and peacebuilding. And the effectiveness of early peacebuilding interventions undertaken by peacekeeping or other interveners, will help support ongoing peacekeeping and peacemaking. One way to visualise this is to see peacekeeping as a bridge between peacemaking and peacebuilding, with the traffic going both ways. Though not effective or even possible in all contexts, UCP is an ideal form of peacekeeping to effectively build this bridge as it combines the aims of peacekeeping with the tools and values of peacebuilding. UCP builds on civilian to civilian partnerships, nonviolence, independence, and nonpartisanship. It has an open and inclusive approach to security as it seeks to engage with threats of violence instead of blocking or eliminating them. Moreover, without promoting a larger agenda or blueprint, it broadens the base of participation by encouraging local actors to become peacekeepers and expand their peacebuilding work. In doing this, UCP can help to protect civilians, while building relationships between local, national and international actors, increasing opportunities to influence the attitudes and behaviour of these actors, and securing space for local actors to address underlying contradictions.
The work of NP in South Sudan provides a vivid demonstration of UCP in action and of the interplay between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. NP has made significant contributions to these three components of the peace processes and played a role in connecting these components and their main proponents with each other. The examples of Western Equatoria and Pibor illustrate that the process from violence to peace is not linear, but jumps back and forth. It also shows that even though there may be an overarching conflict that affects all of South Sudan, states, counties, and communities in South Sudan are differently affected by this conflict and have their own local conflicts. As UCP has a broad toolkit and is grounded in independence and the primacy of local actors, it is flexible to move back and forth between the different stages of the peace process and address the particular needs of communities. Given these strengths, the use of UCP could be expanded in appropriate contexts, to improve the protection of civilians while simultaneously supporting local peacebuilding work. Peacebuilding needs sufficient safety to take hold and peacekeeping needs grounding in local contexts in order to provide that safety and support local peacebuilding.

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Figure 1