Title: Soldiers, civilians and peacekeeping – evidence and false assumptions.

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ABSTRACT

The assumption that peacekeeping requires soldiers carrying weapons is widespread; 35 years of successful peacekeeping by unarmed civilians is often overlooked. The original definition of peacekeeping is being confused with peace enforcement and peace operations. Limited interest has led to underfunding of unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) with fewer resources for both study and praxis. Marginalization of civilian peacekeeping has restricted the options for complex interventions; this reduced vision of peacekeeping is open to challenge in the light of evidence from the field. This paper first examines what is meant by peacekeeping and UCP. The relationship of UCP to nonviolence, feminism, and peace studies is considered. The constraints and limits of peacekeeping by armed military personnel during, or after, violent conflict are outlined. The core tasks of peacekeeping are analysed, and evidence from the field is presented to show that these core tasks can be (and have been) successfully undertaken by unarmed civilians for three decades, world-wide. The argument that armed military personnel are necessary, even essential, for peacekeeping is not supported by the evidence of civilian success in undertaking the core tasks. The paper ends with conclusions and a call for a new paradigm for peacekeeping.

Paper

In mid-2014, women living in the Benitu Protection of Civilians area in South Sudan alerted the unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) team living there that women going out to gather firewood and water were being raped, and sometimes gang-raped, by soldiers. The women reported that the soldiers would sometimes describe the assaults as part of their job. Often, older women took on these chores to protect the younger ones, and decrease the likelihood of attack. Women had to choose between their personal safety and providing for their families' basic needs. The UCP team began accompanying women when they left the camp, sending two or more trained civilian protectors to be visible and patrol along with the women. In the year after this accompaniment was offered no woman was attacked when accompanied. The unarmed civilians had protected the women from direct harm and violence by armed men.

This paper examines the widely held underlying assumptions that peacekeeping requires (i) military personnel, and furthermore (ii) the military peacekeepers need to carry weapons if the peacekeeping is going to work. Evidence is presented to show that for at least 35 years, unarmed civilian peacekeepers have been successfully protecting civilians and supporting the building of peaceful environments through both traditional and new peacekeeping tasks.

A false paradigm has emerged over recent years which assumes the presence of armed military peacekeepers (AMP) is necessary for peacekeeping operations as well as for peace enforcement. Peacekeeping by unarmed civilian peacekeepers (UCP) has not been reported to the same extent, nor been the subject of the same level of research as AMP (albeit there are far greater numbers of AMP missions than UCP projects).

The reasons for sidelining UCP include the need to understand the power of example and persuasion compared with the power of strength and force; without this understanding the idea that unarmed civilians could make a difference and change the behaviour of armed actors in a situation of violent conflict or recent conflict can indeed appear unlikely. Moreover, reporting of peacekeeping, for example on UN websites, has largely focussed on the activities with titles like "What we did?"[1] and not been based on identifying the results of the activities in terms of longer-term outcomes (behaviour, attitude and decision making changes by those influenced by the peacekeeping actions) and the resulting impact (societal level changes - usually the intended benefits for those affected). Reporting based on cost, number of external people involved, or the aspirations of an international mandate, has a strong tendency to overlook the low cost, local, and often fragmented actions of UCP.

This paper is a literature-assessment project that draws on previous research work documenting the development of UCP[2] including both theoretical work and case studies. This literature not only allows us to examine UCP but, by inserting it into the existing peacekeeping domain, allows us to contribute to a greater understanding of how peacekeeping works. In this paper we make a distinction between armed military peacekeeping (AMP) which is taken to include both military personnel and other uniformed and armed professionals (such as police or military advisors accompanied by armed protection), and unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP). AMP includes, for example, missions by UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), African Union (AU), and private military personnel, and is currently the most common type of peacekeeping.

The very few examples of completely unarmed military contingents[3] or local civilian militias taking on a clear peacekeeping role, are not included. This paper argues that UCP shows that a wider range of peacekeeping approaches is possible, not that UCP is the only alternative to AMP.

A large part of the published information about peacekeeping and peace operations missions[4] is based on missions authorised and managed by the UN, and more recently other military missions such as those of the African Union. Reporting only armed interventions supports the unstated assumption that peacekeeping requires an armed military force, whether or not it is a UN operation. UN operations are well publicised and the information is available online. In comparison, UCP is usually carried out by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Peace Brigades International (PBI) or Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP), and civilian agencies such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The documentation from NGOs generally remains internal and confidential, which limits access for researchers.

This paper is not arguing that there is no role for the military in peacekeeping, in some cases the "uniformed and armed" approach to peacekeeping may be required.[5] The conceptual model proposed is that (a) military (or uniformed) personnel, and (b) the availability and use of lethal weapons, are not universally essential for peacekeeping. Furthermore, the use of military personnel and weapons creates problems in managing violence and conflict while building a sustainable peace, not least the documented loss of substantial amounts of weapons, ammunition

[1] UN April 2017
[2] Weber 1993; Moser-Puangsuwan 1996; Booth and Smithey 2007; Coy 1993; Coy 1997; Mahony and Eguren 1997; Schirch 2006; Schweitzer 2001. Others more recent are cited in this paper.
[3] Gehrmann et al 2015
[4] ZIF 2016; CIC 2016; Ramsbotham et al 2015; Bellamy and Williams 2010
[5] Ramsbotham et al 2015:187; Curran and Woodhouse 2007

and other materiel that then fuel the conflict.[6] Even though unarmed civilians are less likely to be killed than armed military peacekeepers,[7] the problems arising from AMP have not been adequately studied or understood, in part because AMP is tacitly accepted as the only available approach. False assumptions like: "if there is violence then you need soldiers", or "peacekeeping is a military activity" have crept in.

This paper first explores what underlines, in literature and practice, armed military peacekeeping and UCP, and suggests that the original definition of peacekeeping has become conflated with peace enforcement, a change that could be hidden by use of the term "peace operations". The relationship of UCP to nonviolence, peace studies and feminism is discussed and the constraints and limits of peacekeeping by armed military personnel during, or after, violent conflict are outlined. The core tasks of traditional peacekeeping are analysed, and evidence from the field is presented to show that these core tasks can be (and have been) successfully undertaken by unarmed civilians for more than three decades, world-wide. The evidence of civilian success in undertaking the core tasks of peacekeeping is analysed and conclusions presented.

Peacekeeping: definition

Peacekeeping does not have a single overall agreed theoretical basis.[8] The current working definition of peacekeeping has drifted away from the original definition, which Schweitzer describes as 'to control potential perpetrators of violence so that they "at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves"[9] this is the meaning of peacekeeping.'[10]

The five principles from the original conception of peacekeeping are:[11]

1. Consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission;
2. Non-use of force except in self-defence;
3. Voluntary contribution of troop contingents from smaller, neutral countries or middle powers;
4. Impartiality;
5. Day-to-day control of the operation by the Secretary-General.

These five principles were laid down by then UN Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson. [12]

The tasks of "traditional" or "conventional" peacekeeping[13] include communication and negotiation with armed actors, presence and proactive presence, interpositioning, monitoring and observing, early warning/early response, capacity building and security. In this paper the available evidence is used to argue these tasks can be, and are, successfully implemented by unarmed civilians.

A new paradigm has emerged by default and without sufficient discussion or rigorous evaluation. Galtung's original definition of peacekeeping as the prevention and reduction of direct violence, when he said "the intention is to 'keep the peace', meaning maintaining absence of direct

[6] Berman, Racovita and Schroeder 2017
[7] Janzen 2014
[8] Pugh 2003:104-112; Bellamy and Williams 2004; Ogunrotifa, Ayodeji Bayo 2011
[9] Galtung 1996:103 cited in Schweitzer 2010
[10] Schweitzer 2010
[11] See Ramsbotham & Woodhouse 1999:xi
[12] Schweitzer 2010
[13] Ramsbotham et al 2015; Bellamy and Williams 2010; and Newby 2016

violence. By that method 'time is gained' "[14] has gradually shifted to a definition more in line with current UN missions. The term 'peacekeeping' is now shorthand for peacekeeping as an activity undertaken by armed uniformed personnel working under military-style command-and-control structures with authority to use lethal force in self-defence. AMP uses weapons, and the point of having weapons is to be able to force people to do something they don't want to do. UCP provides a route through which the term 'peacekeeping' can be interrogated in order to reveal the hidden assumptions within it, and thus allow the creation of new theories and approaches.

In Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Maill the authors define three modes of peacekeeping, related to the stages of the conflict.[15] The phases identified are (i) preventing the escalation of violence to all-out war, "Prevention", (ii) limiting the intensity and spread of war, "Limitation" and (iii) consolidating a ceasefire and creating space for reconstruction, "Stabilization". In this article, the term "peacekeeping" refers to activities that directly prevent or reduce violence, or create a safer environment for civilians; simply completing the activities regardless of the results is not the goal.

Peacekeeping is neither conflict resolution nor peacebuilding, it does not seek a specific solution nor support a particular side in the conflict; peacekeeping in this definition is impartial. Impartiality is not consistently defined in the literature. Schweitzer says that peacekeeping

> [...] seeks to help implement an agreement made by the conflict sides, or to protect and uphold matters of international law (e.g. protection of civilians). [...] there are also groups that focus on protection, but who consciously seek to support one side in a conflict in its struggle. They usually argue that in extremely asymmetrical power situations there can be no nonpartisanship. Perhaps the best examples are the various international groups and projects currently active in Palestine, such as the International Solidarity Movement."[16]

Schweitzer suggests this model for understanding impartiality.

Figure 1. Objectives of civilian peacekeeping (Schweitzer, Civilian Peacekeeping 13)[17]

[14] Galtung 1976:283
[15] Ramsbotham et al 2015:173
[16] Schweitzer 2010
[17] Schweitzer 2010:13



Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Maill recognise that the use of the broad term 'peace operations' has blurred the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Taking an example from Mali, these authors note that the peacekeeping intervention included counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency which 'may be seen to remove such operations even further from the standard practices of peacekeeping.'[18] Peace enforcement concerns activities, usually immediately prior to peacekeeping, where force or armed force is used to reduce or end violent engagement. Without consent, activities are, correctly, peace enforcement not peacekeeping and in the enforcement phase weapons and military force may indeed be required.

Security itself, usually a key component of a mission mandate in peacekeeping,[19] is a contested area in the literature. While state military security and militarisation still dominate, new thinking about security[20] has opened it up to include areas related to the security of individuals and communities, protection of civilians, and human security. The first principles of security are "freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity",[21] but this is in contrast to the way in which states seek security through military spending and military alliances. For example 'The UK's "determination to remain one of the most important powers on the international stage", as Malcolm Chalmers at the Royal United Services Institute has said [...], powerfully shapes security policy.'[22]

[18] Ramsbotham et al. 2015:185
[19] UN no date
[20] The Ammerdown Group 2016
[21] UN General Assembly 2005:143 cited in The Ammerdown Group 2016:8
[22] The Ammerdown Group 2016

Booth and Smithey describe how UCP is aligned with human security, in contrast to the state focus on national security, force projection and maintaining national interests.[23] The Ammerdown Group argue that security strategy employed to deal with current threats is the same intervention policy that has been largely ineffective, and propose new security thinking, which parallels the proposal for new peacekeeping thinking in this paper.

UCP cannot step completely outside the state security system. Coy[24] argues that UCP still needs work visas and permission to work, and shows how privilege plays a role when UCP relies on people from wealthy developed countries not being targeted (which was more the case in Sri Lanka than Mindanao, so privilege is also contextual). In Mindanao UCP took on a formal ceasefire monitoring role in the peace agreement. With an official role in the ceasefire, UCP staff worked at the highest national level directly communicating with the leaders of the armed actors through the ceasefire agreement. The UCP country director in Philippines was able to contact leaders of the armed actors at any time and influenced armed actors to remain in their barracks after rumours that they were about to attack, showing how UCP can work within the security system.

The change in meaning from "traditional peacekeeping" to the UN paradigm of AMP within broader peace operations has not been rigorously assessed on the basis of evidence, indeed the assumption that weapons are required in peacekeeping has been relatively unchallenged. Peacekeeping needs a rethink.

Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping: definition

This paper now examines how UCP matches the different descriptions of peacekeeping in the existing literature on peacekeeping, peace studies, feminism and nonviolence.

UCP is a descriptive term for a range of activities based on a set of common principles:
1. Nonviolence is the underpinning principle, weapons are neither carried nor used.
2. The work of peacekeeping is done by civilians, rather than military personnel without weapons.
3. The 'primacy of the local' guides actions. Peacekeeping organisations do not arrive with an agenda set externally, nor bring their own "solutions" to the "problem", but identify resources and solutions located in the area and among the people who live there. The exact definition and boundary of "local" is contested in the literature, but a "local" focus is clearly different from external organisations working either without the participation of local people, or without consulting them.

The name unarmed civilian peacekeeping, UCP, is used in this article to provide a descriptive overarching term to identify a field of study rather than to define or constrain the practices of organisations. The terms practitioners use for UCP include: peace teams, accompaniment, unarmed civilian protection and third party nonviolent intervention.[25] The different terms are used to identify and define the specific focus or approach of different organisations.

UCP has been variously defined as: "the prevention of direct violence through influence or control of the behaviour of potential perpetrators by unarmed civilians who are deployed on the

[23] Booth and Smithey 2007
[24] Coy 1993
[25] Julian and Schweitzer 2015

ground"; "activities by civilians to prevent or reduce violence so as to make it safe for others to engage in peacebuilding activities"; and "efforts by unarmed civilian third parties, in the field, to prevent or diminish violence by influencing or controlling potential perpetrators for the purpose of protecting people and making it safe for local people to engage in peace and justice efforts."[26] More expansively, UCP

> […] is the practice of deploying unarmed civilians before, during, and after violent conflict, to prevent or reduce violence, to provide direct physical protection to other civilians, and to strengthen or build resilient local peace infrastructures. The purpose of UCP is to create a safer environment, or a 'safer space', for civilians to address their own needs, solve their own conflicts, and protect vulnerable individuals and populations in their midst.[27]

Identifying UCP as an emancipatory, normative and democratic response to dealing with violent conflict places it within the domain of peace studies. Rather than being a purely theoretical approach, this paper shows that civilian peacekeeping is a concrete, real and proven peacekeeping method. Directly responding to human rights abuses is at the core of all UCP work. For example, in Guatemala, and Colombia, UCP teams documented human rights abuses and specifically protected human rights defenders; PBI does this everywhere they work, including Aceh, and Colombia; and the Balkan Peace Team also responded to human rights abuses.

One of the most important features of UCP is that it is rooted in nonviolence theory.[28] In this context nonviolence is the active engagement and involvement of trained people, utilising the power of communication, relationships and of "being observed" to change the behaviour of armed actors without the threat or use of force. Nonviolence is one of the principles of UCP[29] and is a growing field of study providing credible evidence of the efficacy of nonviolence. Chenoweth and Stephan showed that nonviolence is twice as likely as violence to work in securing large scale social change,[30] and Bartkowski demonstrated the breadth of use of nonviolence across the world that has largely gone unnoticed or unrecognised.[31] While UCP does not require participants to be pacifist, it does follow the line of pacifist thought and argument which questions the assumptions that: violence solves problems, violence can effectively halt violence, or that military personnel are legitimate actors to intervene.

Nonviolence is, however, a contested concept - the biggest division is between principled and pragmatic. Schweitzer identified this model as the Pragmatic-principled dimension (Figure 2).

Figure 2 The Pragmatic-Principled dimension.[32]

Table: The pragmatic-principled dimension

Criterion	Pragmatic nonviolence	Principled nonviolence
Nature of commitment	Most effective	Ethically best

[26] Schweitzer 2010:9; Wallis 2010; Furnari 2014:38
[28] Oldenhuis 2015
[28] Schweitzer 2001; Julian and Schweitzer 2015
[29] Schweitzer 2010; Furnari 2016
[30] Chenoweth and Stephan 2011
[31] Bartkowski 2013; see also Mosuer-Puangsuwan and Weber 2000; Schirch 2006; Mahony and Eguren 1997
[32] Schweitzer 2001:8

Means and end	Separate: ends justify means, but also: nonviolence means may be used for unjust ends (Goss-Mayr)	Indivisible
Approach to conflict	Incompatible interests	Shared problem
Approach to opponent	Gain victory over him, if necessary by coercion	Convince him, if necessary by accepting own suffering
Nonviolence as way of life?	Not necessarily	Probably

Burrowes 1996:100 modified by Christine Schweitzer.

Booth and Smithey discuss ways in which UCP has a relationship with nonviolent resistance.[33] Using nonviolence means that UCP teams need discipline and commitment to nonviolence in the way they live, work, speak and act. Groups who practice UCP all explicitly commit to being wholly nonviolent, meaning they use it in principled manner, although there is a pragmatic reason for using it - because it works as an effective method of protecting people. An example was the provision by PBI of protection to many key human rights and social justice activists during the Guatemalan civil war.[34] After the end of the conflict, a number of the people who had been protected were elected to government, or provided key leadership in organisations that engaged in significant peacebuilding work.

Nonviolence is not only the absence of violence or weapons; active nonviolence implies ways of designing and implementing projects that are different from mainstream humanitarian work. As a result, UCP projects are less likely to be co-opted to the methods of international humanitarian and peacebuilding "industries" than AMP.[35] Pugh and Cunliffe both discuss the ways peacekeeping can reinforce or maintain imperialism and the status quo.[36] This paper shows how nonviolence is actively offering an alternative to AMP, and also to the challenges posed by the liberal imperialism of international aid and peacebuilding systems.

UCP is not a new concept and has been used for at least three decades,[37] but has not been widely studied. The literature on peacekeeping has frequently marginalised the potential of UCP,[38] even when that potential has been demonstrated in other contexts.[39] The absence of reporting of the potential - and the success - of UCP cannot be construed as evidence that UCP is ineffective.

UCP theory does not directly fit into the way in which the development of peacekeeping is described in large sections of the peacekeeping literature,[40] even where there is a focus on traditional peacekeeping (with the criterion of consent). In Bellamy and Williams (2010), while dis-

[33] Booth and Smithey 2007
[34] Mahoney and Eguren 1987
[36] Barnett et al 2014; Autessere 2014b
[36] Pugh 2004; Cunliffe 2013
[37] Mahony and Eguren 1997; Schweitzer 2001; Furnari 2016
[38] Ramsbotham et al 2015
[39] Schweitzer 2001
[40] Ramsbotham at al 2015:192; Bellamy and Williams 2010

cussing preventive deployments, the authors specifically exclude civilian activities and only discuss the deployment of "uniformed personnel (soldiers, military observers, and police)".[41] Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Maill mention UCP as part of their exploration of critical peacekeeping studies. Critical peacekeeping theory suggests that new forms of democratic peacekeeping will emerge[42] and "mention is made of purely civilian peacekeepers"[43] who emerged from the "third sector", i.e. UCP is outside state and UN control. Dismissing UCP because it is a third sector approach, or marginalising UCP by failing to report its successes, ignores a body of evidence. These long-term successes, evident in multiple situations (see Table 1) create a pathway for critical peacekeeping studies to engage with the challenges of complex contemporary violent conflicts. For example, in Georgia a UCP team worked with villages on the disputed border to increase security, and build local early warning and response mechanisms. The team worked to limit the trigger effects of border violations in the conflict, and enabled villagers to create micro-security agreements about the movement of livestock and commemoration.[44]

UCP raises criticisms of conventional peacekeeping research for not challenging the assumed use of military and weapons. The use of military force is, however, challenged in peacebuilding and conflict transformation literature, and the use of UCP draws on the transformative approaches of peacebuilding and conflict resolution, and local peacebuilding.[45] This paper places the UCP approach within critical peacekeeping theory, although the practice of UCP, as will be shown, is based on the same tasks "on the ground" as traditional peacekeeping. The focus on the "local" places UCP within emancipatory thinking and transformative approaches as outlined by Lederach and Curle.[46]

When commenting on the 2012 ZIF report,[47] Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Maill wondered if a cosmopolitan peacekeeping future could be attained,[48] and also suggested that emancipatory approaches are the follow on from the critique of cosmopolitan peacekeeping. UCP presents an option for future peacekeeping that fits a more radical critique than those of Pugh, Cunliffe, and Bellamy and Williams.[49] Cunliffe describes UN peacekeeping as "the highest form of liberal imperialism"[50] but UCP steps outside the boundaries of state and therefore provides a way of analysing peacekeeping outside traditional state and UN structures.

This paper proposes that UCP is a more radical embodiment of emancipatory peacekeeping[51] and the beginnings of recognition are in the 2014 High Level Panel report on Peace Operations[52] where "unarmed strategies" are included as important.[53]

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[41] Bellamy and Williams 2010:155
[42] Pugh 2004:53-4
[43] Ramsbotham et al. 2015:193
[44] Julian and Furnari 2013
[45] Francis 2013; Fetherstone 1994; Lederach 1997; Lederach and Lederach 2011; Paffenholz 2014; MacGinty and Richmond 2013; Furnari et al 2015
[46] Lederach 2011, Curle 1996
[47] ZIF 2016
[48] Ramsbotham et al. 2015:197
[49] Pugh 2004; Cunliffe 2013; Bellamy and Williams 2004
[50] Cunliffe 2013
[51] Richmond 2007
[52] UN 2015a
[53] UN 2015a

Civilian peacekeeping sees the provision of security as its central task and does not engage in development work. UCP builds relationships with the clear intention of placing local needs at the centre of their work, they do not need to engage in a benefactor role through humanitarian aid distribution in order to engage with local communities.

Feminist approaches have also looked at nonviolent methods and tools in response to violence.[54] Feminism challenges the patriarchal values that underpin a reliance on the military and highlights its damaging impact. UCP, in its rejection of militarism, is aligned with the alternative vision of peace and security in feminist approaches, and recognises the significance of gender in peacekeeping activities. UCP can make it easier for women to get their issues addressed. For example, in Sri Lanka, a UCP team enabled negotiation between a group of women and the military who had just abducted their children; the children were returned to the women.[55] Although most UCP teams actively seek diversity and gender balance, two examples of women only teams are "The Women's Peace Service"[56] and "South Sudan Women's Peacekeeping Teams".[57]

There is a difference between unarmed peacekeeping where it is the military who are unarmed and UCP by civilians using nonviolence, without military culture or training. There are civilians who serve in UN military peacekeeping missions, but the available data suggest they are in supporting roles within a military mission, and are therefore not UCP in the definition used above.[58]

In contemporary complex violent conflicts, and in the context of most peacekeeping missions, not all the armed actors will have reached full agreement, nor will they all be disarmed and prepared to become part of the peace process - if indeed there is one. Thus, the distinction between peacebuilding and peacekeeping is often blurred. UCP missions have included projects in areas where, although some, or many, of the armed actors have agreed to stay in barracks, desist from attacks, or disarm, there are also armed actors who have continued to be active (examples include Mindanao, South Sudan, Colombia and Myanmar). In these cases UCP has still been shown to be able to protect civilians and change the behaviour of armed actors.[59]
The AMP principle of "non-use of force except in self defence and defence of the mandate" and the concept of "robust peacekeeping" are important dividing principles between AMP and UCP. In UCP the guiding principles are nonviolence and the primacy of the local.[60]

The understanding of consent is one of the key differences between UN AMP missions and NGO UCP missions. Top-down formal consent through a state and UN system, with an agreement made through high-level and frequently remote accords, is in direct contrast to UCP which develops formal or informal consent at a national and, crucially, a local level through the development of trusting and strong relationships with both armed and peace actors in the conflict.[61]

Limitations of AMP compared to UCP

There has been insufficient attention given to the analysis of both the strengths and the concur-

[54] McAllister 1983; Hutchings and Frazer 2014; Enloe 2001
[55] Schweitzer 2009
[56] IWPS n.d.
[57] NP 2017
[58] White and Julian 2017
[59] Julian 2017
[60] Julian and Schweitzer 2015
[61] Furnari 2012; Furnari 2014

rent limitations of AMP, especially in comparison to UCP. As already noted in this paper, this assertion is based on peacekeeping in the original sense, not peace enforcement, nor broader peace operations. The evidence suggests several disadvantages of AMP when compared to UCP. The disadvantages become more apparent when peacekeeping is evaluated on the results achieved (outcomes and impacts) instead of the level of activity and resources used.

Peacekeeping necessarily happens in places where there are high levels of violence, but also where there is willingness and interest by at least some actors to secure a safer and more peaceful space. Deploying a military peacekeeping team, with weapons, exemplifies a strategy that violence can only be prevented by the threat or use of further violence. Evidence from Elworthy and Rifkind, as well as interviews with military peacekeepers shows that not just the use of weapons but the threat of violence by peacekeepers tends to reinforce the cycle of violence.[62]

Civilian leadership is a core element of constructing a lasting peace, but the authority and ability of armed peacekeepers to overrule local civilian leaders reinforces a lower status for the civilian leadership. UCP of necessity works with, and through, local leadership. One example of local unarmed leadership was the Mindanao Ceasefire and Peace agreement in 2009 where civilians, using UCP, were assigned responsibility for civilian protection and ceasefire monitoring in local communities. The unarmed civilian peacekeepers had a clear, legitimate role validated by recognition from both armed and civilian actors.[63] Another example comes from Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), where the ceasefire agreement required that all supporting international interventions must be unarmed. Some of the peacekeepers were military, some police and some civilians, but the Bougainville Revolutionary Army believed that to de-escalate the violence and to promote peace, it was necessary to eschew new military presence.[64]

Local ownership of solutions is essential if they are to succeed, but military peacekeeping structures generally exclude or diminish local ownership in solution-finding, making a transition to long-term locally-led peacebuilding slower.[65] The understanding of the context and requirements for effective and sustainable peacebuilding has developed over the past 20 years to include the recognition that inclusion and ownership by the local population are essential .[66] Although military peacekeeping teams meet with local people, command-and-control military structures, very often with links to an international decision-making process, generally do not allow local people to determine the focus or goals of the peacekeeping team they interact with. Even when the intention is to include local input, there is significant evidence that this is poorly understood and implemented.[67] As a result, when peacekeeping hands over to, or works at the same time as, peacebuilding actors (who are, by contrast, overwhelmingly civilian) there may be little or no relationship between the peacekeeping mission and the local initiatives, perhaps already underway, that are required to build a sustainable peace. Pugh shows how the rescuer-victim model is reinforced where "innocent and helpless women and children are projected as visual emblems of crisis"[68] and this is used in the justification of peace enforcement and AMP. An alternative non-militarised model would include local civilians as participants and leaders, and recognise the agency of local people in the process of building peace and creating security.

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[62] Elworthy and Rifkind 2005; Furnari 2014
[63] Furnari 2016a
[64] Gehrmann et al. 2015
[65] Galtung 1976; Ramsbotham et al 2015; Bellamy and Williams 2010; Furnari et al 2015
[66] Paffenholz 2014; Recyler 2001; MacGinty and Richmond 2013
[67] Pouligny 2006; Zanotti 2006 and Autessere 2014a
[68] Pugh 2004:48

Where local leadership is opposed to some part of a national or international agenda or agreement, the contribution of AMP may be perceived as negative because it is mandated to implement a distant agenda. Civilian peacekeeping is currently carried out principally by smaller International NGOs who are largely independent of the agendas of global powers and large multilateral institutions[69] and are not trying to implement them.

There can be a very significant difference between AMP and UCP as to how accessible peacekeepers are to local people. Military peacekeepers usually live in separate barracks and are often rotated on short to medium tours of duty, limiting the trust and relationship building that can take place. Janzen argues that AMP staff have a mortality rate 12 times higher than UCP staff[70] which reinforces the view that separate accommodation with a defensible perimeter barrier is required for peacekeepers. Separation and barriers reduce accessibility to peacekeepers by local people. By contrast, civilian peacekeepers live and work in houses in the affected communities - shopping at the local shops and market, visiting local villages and religious and community leaders, meeting with local police and military commanders. Civilian peacekeepers are required to integrate, to learn at least a minimum level of the local language, and to understand and respect local customs. In contrast to the "external" model of AMP, civilian peacekeeping teams require acceptance of their presence by the local actors in order to function effectively and securely:[71] the team cannot retreat to a base with a secure perimeter.

Local civilian ceasefire monitors (using UCP) are often particularly valuable in that they notice, or are informed by neighbours, about worrisome changes immediately – including subtle changes that might go unnoticed by military personnel from a foreign country, isolated in a barracks, without knowledge of the local language, customs and culture. Civilians are likely to hear rumours and can be well-placed to investigate and de-escalate before retaliation for perceived injustices has begun. One example is the Mindanao Ceasefire and Peace agreement in 2009, where joint international and local civilian teams lived and worked in the affected communities. As a result the civilian ceasefire monitors could be easily contacted, and they could respond quickly to the need to monitor escalating situations, negotiate pauses in fighting to allow civilians to evacuate, and investigate incidents.[72] Another example comes from Sri Lanka, where one NP field site was asked by a group of mothers for accompaniment when they went to request the return of their abducted children. The UCP team immediately accompanied the women to the gates of the compound where they believed the children had been taken. Instead of threatening the women, the armed actors let them wait and restate their request, and by the end of the day the children were released. The next time there was an abduction, the women were more confident to go by themselves. In a further example, the presence of UCP providing international accompaniment in San Jose de Apartado, Colombia, contributed to a decrease in violent attacks, in part because of their continual presence.[73]

The limitation of access to, and by, local people has also been noted by AMP staff. One high-level military leader who had served in several peacekeeping missions noted he was more able to connect with people when he was an unarmed observer, then when armed.

> When I used to go to the villages [...] people do not prefer to see a stranger approaching to

[69] Julian and Schweitzer 2015
[70] Janzen 2014
[71] Schweitzer 2010; Furnari 2016
[72] Furnari 2016a
[73] Lindsay-Poland 2016

> you, an armed stranger approaching to you, a stranger with a weapon. When I had no weapons, I could access people, people had confidence at the first sight… People used to welcome us more, but if you are there with a weapon, you are looked at in a different way. People used to think about it before talking with you. But without a weapon we have more, military observers have more access. Which is very true, that is what I have found myself.[74]

Many places where peacekeeping teams are working (either military or civilian) are highly militarised societies where military force projection is accepted as normal,[75] and this is reinforced by adding a further military presence with weapons through AMP. A high degree of militarisation requires the reallocation of resources from social purposes such as health and education to fund the military. South Sudan continues to fund a civil war while providing very little in the way of education or health services, is just one example. In many militarised countries, the military have taken on additional powers or roles. Where armed conflict occurs, peaceful actors and nonviolent conflict processes have often been marginalised in favour of military approaches. As Francis has consistently pointed out, this provides a perverse incentive to be an armed actor and to maintain a level of violence, in order to be included in the future benefits of a peace process. By contrast, with nonviolence at its heart, UCP demonstrates a model that challenges militarism and supports civil society[76].

As they live in the community, UCP staff are continuously observed. Of necessity, they build relationships with people with different perspectives on, and roles in, the conflict. The actions of UCP staff, and their interactions with local people can provide an important opportunity for local people to develop the knowledge and skills required for peacebuilding, and for UCP staff to gain insight into traditional norms for addressing conflict. Paying attention to, and showing appreciation for, traditional norms for addressing conflict nonviolently can encourage and invigorate their use. This opportunity is largely absent in the case of AMP staff. One person who reflected on the UCP work in South Sudan suggested that perhaps the most important contribution was the training and support to a number of South Sudanese who, long after NP leaves, would still be committed to nonviolence and working with others to address conflicts nonviolently.[77] Even where there is no traditional conflict resolution, UCP encourages debate and development of nonviolent responses, which underpins conflict resolution, local peacebuilding, human rights and peaceful social change. The basis of nonviolent methods is good relationships, inclusivity and tolerance.[78]

The issues of gender and peacekeeping include not only discrimination but even cases of direct sexual exploitation by peacekeepers. Women who have experienced sexual abuse and rape in war do not want to see more armed male soldiers. The UN have made efforts to recruit more women to peacekeeping missions, but since there are few serving military personnel who are women and able to serve from the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), the vast majority of peacekeepers are men. UCP recruits teams with a better gender balance and greater diversity. The UCP team itself can demonstrate good gender relations between male and female staff, who may also be able to access different actors and communities.

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[74] Furnari 2014
[75] Francis 2010; Francis 2013
[76] Schweitzer 2010
[77] Furnari 2016b
[78] Atack 2012; Carter et al 2013; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011

The Core Tasks of Peacekeeping

By returning to the original definition of peacekeeping with its core principles, it is possible to explore how peacekeeping can be delivered either by military personnel or by civilians. To do this, the main tasks of peacekeepers must first be identified. The list in Table 1 results from combining the descriptions on the website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), the description by Newby from the United Nations Interim force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and the work of Furnari following her interviews with frontline peacekeepers including military, police and unarmed civilians.[79]

If analysis of the tasks, supported by evidence from the field (Table 1), shows that unarmed civilians can also successfully undertake these tasks, then there will be a case for UCP, and peacekeeping in general, that works outside military structures and methods.

A key challenge of defining specific tasks that are *successfully* performed by UCP, or by AMP, is that there is no established metric for "success" in terms of outcomes and societal level impacts. Nor is there agreement on how to identify the causal links between peacekeeper presence or activity, armed actors changing their behaviour, and any subsequent improvements to daily life for local people. UCP is not claiming that all violence and armed actors can be stopped through the tasks of peacekeeping, but neither can AMP make this claim. Claims that the presence and activities of peacekeepers will automatically lead to an improvement in the lives of local people are open to challenge unless cause and effect can be demonstrated. There is some empirical evidence to support the view that UCP can change the behaviour of armed actors and prevent violence.[80]

While the debates about the theory and principles of peacekeeping have changed in the last 50 years, the activities and tasks of peacekeeping have not changed in substance. The mandates now include the protection of civilians and human rights, but peacekeepers still patrol, monitor and provide presence to deter violence.[81] Security sector reform is sometimes included as a task of peacekeeping, however among civilians it is more usually carried out by peacebuilding organisations.

The body of knowledge referenced includes work done to define and describe the field in both published and unpublished literature, NP and PBI evaluations from field projects that have been made publicly available, and websites from the organisations in Figure 2. One of the challenges of research in this field is the limitation of the dataset. Much of the material that could be used for case studies is contained within confidential or team reports; only where these have been made public are they included.

The table of evidence

The first column shows the task, the second column lists examples from UCP and the third column is the organisation involved. The intention is to demonstrate that many of the tasks associated with peacekeeping can be done by both AMP and UCP. The majority of the data are from PBI and NP in the last 35 years, primarily because these have been the two largest organisations and, as Schweitzer notes,[82] they share the view of 'impartiality' that most closely fits traditional peacekeeping. The tasks have been grouped by type and the analysis will identify the ways in

[79] Newby 2016; Furnari 2014
[80] Oldenhuis 2015
[81] Bellamy and Williams 2010:175; UN n.d.
[82] Schweitzer 2001

which UCP includes traditional peacekeeping tasks.

TABLE 1
Table 1. The choice of organisations used for this table is determined by publicly available data from the publications cited; it is not exhaustive of all UCP organisations.

Task description	**Reference where it is used in UCP**	**Which organisations are involved?**
Presence, patrolling, protection, influencing behaviour		
Presence - the patrolling and being visible in areas affected by violence, or where violence may occur	Sri Lanka , South Sudan, Colombia, Palestine where their interviews indicated the 'necessity of wide, consistent, presence'. Mindanao where it is under 'proactive engagement'[i]	NP CPT, Fellowship of Reconciliation (FoR), Swedish FoR (SweFoR) PBI EAPPI
Patrol disputed lines - micro security agreements	Georgia working with villages on the disputed border. Colombia and the peace zones and villages.	NP FoR PBI
Protect civilians.	In Colombia the protection is often from state violence (or state tacit approval of violence) and in Sri Lanka children were prevented from being abducted through presence Mindanao, South Sudan included protecting women from rape through proactive presence and accompaniment.[ii]	PBI NP
Change behavior of armed actors - this can be that they stop or limit some part of previous behaviour	For example in South Sudan and Colombia, UCP has prevented killing and disappearances by armed actors through their presence and accompaniment.[iii]	NP PBI
Monitoring, observing, informing		
Monitoring and Reporting mechanisms for resolving disputes	For example, in Sri Lanka and Colombia communities are supported to get involved in creating safe spaces and opportunities for peaceful dispute resolution, including shuttle diplomacy and bringing parties together.[iv]	NP PBI

Monitor and observe peace processes in post conflict areas	In Mindanao, Myanmar, Bourganville, and in OSCE missions such as Kosovo, unarmed peacekeepers have been monitoring ceasefires and peace processes Mindanao. OSCE long-term missions.[v]	NP OSCE New Zealand military
Elections: patrols, advice, distribute ballot materials and provide public information	OSCE and Council of Europe regularly have unarmed civilian election monitors Sri Lanka NP with PAFFREL in 2003 in civilian election monitoring.[vi]	OSCE EU Monitoring Mission. NP
Communication: negotiation, collaboration, advocacy		
Negotiate with high level military to control troop behaviour	In Sri Lanka and Mindano unarmed civilians directly negotiated with high-level military and commanders to change the behaviour of troops.[vii]	NP
Shuttle diplomacy	In Sri Lanka and Mindanao unarmed civilian peacekeepers were involved in shuttle diplomacy – carrying messages between groups in order to reduce violence or peacefully resolve a dispute.[viii]	NP
Collaboration with other protection actors	Collaboration is essential for all protection wor; there are examples of UCP teams working with a range of actors including UN, state, NGO and other protection actors. Locations include South Sudan working with the Protection Cluster, Sri Lanka – informal cooperation with Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission,Georgia working with the EU Monitoring Mission.[ix]	NP PBI
Advocacy and human rights advice	The teams in Israel–Palestine and Mindanao are examples of where UCP teams protect through advocacy on security issues, and provide information and advice on human rights.[x]	Christian Peacemakers Team (CPT) Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) NP PBI
Negotiate with armed groups (child protection)	UCP teams in Colombia and Sri Lanka have examples of direct negotiation with armed groups, including preventing child abduction and child protection.[xi]	NP PBI

Investigation and responding to findings		
Investigate violations of a ceasefire	In Mindanao UCP had a formal role in investigations of ceasefire violations. The armed actors also confirmed they were responsive to the UCP monitors.[xii]	NP
Human Rights monitoring, investigating and analysis	UCP teams in Israel/Palestine and the Balkan Peace Team in Croatia and Bosnia monitored human rights cases and abuses, including reporting and analysis provided to other authorities.[xiii]	PBI Balkan Peace Team (BPT)
Respond to human rights violations	Examples from Guatemala, Colombia and the Balkan Peace Team show how UCP teams have responded to abuses and violations of human rights with investigations and protection to those affected.[xiv]	PBI BPT NP
Early warning and early response		
Early warning and early response for both violence and human rights	In Mindanao, Georgia and Myanmar UCP developed a new approach where they supported local people learning how to recognize early warning signs for violence and know how to respond.[xv]	NP
Rumour control	Mindanao and Sri Lanka are two examples where UCP teams have intervened to prevent rumours triggering further violent responses.[xvi]	NP
Peacekeeping tasks not undertaken by AMP		
Provide nonviolent security across a conflict zone	Teams in Mindanao, South Sudan and Colombia provided non-military security over a wide area. In Mindanao in 2011, there were 102 UCP staff members securing several areas of violent conflict.[xvii]	NP FoR
Create weapons free zones	In South Sudan and Colombia UCP have supported and enabled local people to secure spaces without weapons to improve safety.[xviii]	NP FoR, CPT, SweFOR, PBI
Capacity development		

Assist in-country (military) personnel with training.	UCP team trains the military in International Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights.[xix]	NP
Help rebuild the criminal justice system	UCP is not currently involved in this activity.	
Capacity building. training in local community based protection methods, healing and trauma, and dialogue	UCP projects in Israel/Palestine, Colombia, and the Balkan Peace Team all demonstrate training and capacity building. Specialist agencies have also emerged using UCP principles.[xx]	BPT PBI Protection International

Discussion of the evidence.

Presence, patrolling, protection, influencing behaviour

Presence is the task of being visible in areas affected by violence, or where it may occur, and either deterring armed actors from using violence, or presenting alternatives to the use of violence. Presence is used widely in UCP with examples including Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Colombia, Papua New Guinea[83]. McCarthy and Pinckney's research indicated the "necessity of wide, consistent, presence" in Palestine.[84] In Mindanao, Phillipines, presence is used on a daily basis and described as "proactive engagement".[85]

Examples of patrolling include Sri Lanka where teams spent time visiting remote villages and areas experiencing tensions; the abduction of children was prevented by international civilian presence at likely places for abductions. In Colombia, the protection given by UCP is often from state violence, or violence tacitly approved by the state. Presence and patrolling by national and international unarmed civilians helped protect peace communities, for example in San Jose de Apartado.[86] Work in South Sudan included protecting women from rape through proactive presence and accompaniment.[87]

UCP interpositioning takes the form of preventing injury, killing and disappearance by directly engaging with armed actors and changing their behaviour. Interpositioning has prevented killing and disappearance in South Sudan and Colombia.[88] There are examples by Mahony and PBI of PBI's work in Colombia on how accompaniment includes interpositioning by standing between human rights defenders and those who threaten them.[89] In Mindanao, UCP tasks included interpositioning between armed actors to allow civilians to safely evacuate.[90] Kern describes how a UCP team stood between a Palestinian youth demonstration and a line of Israeli soldiers ready to

[83] Mahony 2006; Gehrmann, et al. 2015
[84] McCarthy and Pinckney 2016:99
[85] Furnari 2016a:149
[86] PBI n.d.
[87] Furnari 2016b
[88] PBI 2009; NP n.d.
[89] Mahoney 2006; PBI 2012
[90] Furnari 2016a:149

fire and as a result, the soldiers lowered their weapons.[91]

Monitoring, observing, informing

Monitoring and observing in areas of violent conflict is about making sure agreements are upheld, looking for triggers of violence, and collecting information on changes in the area that might influence a move between peace and violence. UCP works to develop and support community ceasefire monitoring as well as monitoring by international peacekeepers.

In Sri Lanka, UCP staff worked with local election monitors from local peace organisations during national elections in 2003.[92] South Sudan and Georgia are examples of UCP projects that created new reporting mechanisms that were linked to existing procedures, to ensure that monitoring revealed events that needed to be reported, and responses were made. In both places there were other state run monitoring missions (Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission and the EU Monitoring Mission respectively), but the UCP staff were more accessible to local people. The UCP teams were able to sit, for example, with communities who lived near disputed borders, and help them discuss the threats they experienced, the fears they lived with, and understand their choices and actions in response. This could include telephoning to warn people, knowing who is in command and how to contact them, and having safe routes for people to escape if violence flares up.[93] In Mindanao, as part of the ceasefire and peace process, UCP organisations had the official role of monitoring, reporting, and investigating ceasefire agreements.[94]

Communication: negotiation, collaboration, advocacy

UCP works through establishing and maintaining strong relationships at all levels and with all actors during or after a violent conflict. This is common to all projects and is part of the theoretical approach by Mahony and Eguren, Furnari, and Schweitzer.[95] There is documented evidence from Mindanao (Phillipines), South Sudan and Colombia of UCP effectively employing communication strategies with armed and unarmed actors to protect civilians and reduce levels of violence. In Sri Lanka, UCP staff carried out shuttle diplomacy between armed actors and local fishermen to create an agreement on having a place where they could safely fish. In Mindanao, as the ceasefire was threatened by expiring mandates, the UCP team used shuttle diplomacy between the stakeholders (combined with protecting civilians on the ground) to achieve an extension to the ceasefire agreements. The relationships that had been established enabled the UCP teams to call on senior military and armed group staff to control their troops when threats occurred.[96]

Like AMP, UCP does not work in isolation; people's needs interrelate and programme success comes from collaboration in integrating expertise and capacities across different organisations. Coy has introduced the idea of "cooperative accompaniment".[97] The cooperation not only makes UCP more likely to succeed because more organisations are aware of the work and the role of the team members, but the team members are more easily able to bring in other expertise to help with aspects not covered by UCP. UCP teams collaborate with other protection actors including

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[91] Kern 2009
[92] Schweitzer 2012
[93] Oldenhuis 2016
[94] Furnari 2016a:147
[95] Mahony and Eguren 1997; Furnari 2014, Schweitzer 2001
[96] Furnari 2016a:150
[97] Coy 1997

police and AMP teams. In South Sudan UCP plays a key role in the protection cluster and in building strong protection mechanisms. In South Sudan and the Philippines, NP cooperates with international peacekeepers, in Sri Lanka there was informal cooperation with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. In Georgia the UCP team worked with the EU Monitoring Mission, and PBI maintains contact with police and other protection actors where they work.

In their role of providing advocacy and human rights advice, UCP teams worked with local human rights organisations in Sri Lanka. For UCP projects in Israel/Palestine, advocacy is both local and international.[98] PBI has developed strong relationships both in individual projects and also to enable their work and protection of human rights defenders worldwide.[99]
In Mindanao work included advocacy on civilian protection with the government and other armed actors, and on basic needs with other agencies.[100]

Investigation and responding to findings

In Mindanao, as part of the ceasefire and peace process, UCP had the official role of monitoring, reporting and investigating ceasefire agreements.[101] Furnari described in detail how the violations monitoring and reporting was carried out there and gave an example of the work of UCP with two armed forces, which were about to attack each other. UCP personnel talked to both sides who were persuaded to stop the attack and leave. The armed actors confirmed they were responding to the UCP monitors.[102]

The focus on human rights monitoring and investigation of abuses is also evidenced through the PBI work of protecting human rights defenders.[103] In Israel/Palestine, McCartney and Pinckney showed how monitoring and documentation were used.[104] Human rights investigation is, of course, much wider than UCP (for example, the work of Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch), but peacekeepers become involved when the human rights actors are threatened or civilians need direct protection from violence and human rights abuses.

Early warning and early response.

Early warning is provided by local people and international peacekeepers working together to study the activities of armed actors, or other events, that indicate imminent violence or threat. When evidence suggests the threat is significant, for example, if there are new troop movements, local people can then respond. Responses can include reporting, contacting commanders, people can hide or flee, or international peacekeepers (armed or unarmed) can be deployed to the area.

In Mindanao, an early warning and response system was set up with many local people trained and involved in making it an effective and widespread system.[105] There are local examples where people set up safe routes or hiding places and informal communication systems, for example hiding in the bush in Sudan when villages are attacked.[106] Rumour control is a key task in preventing violence escalation. To address this issue in Mindanao UCP teams collected information and monitored, and communicated with all parties to prevent rumours being used as an excuse for

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[98] McCarthy and Pickney 2010:103
[99] PBI 2009; PBI 2011
[100] Furnari 2016a
[101] Furnari 2016a:147
[102] Furnari 2016a:15; Furnari 2016a:162
[103] Mahony and Eguren 1997
[104] McCartney and Pinkney 2016:102
[105] Englebrecht and Kaushik 2015; Furnari 2016a:153
[106]Bedigen 2016

retaliation. In Sri Lanka, UCP staff being present and documenting incidents of violence and human rights abuses, having good relationships and communicating well, helped to prevent rumours escalating.

Peacekeeping tasks not undertaken by AMP.

"Providing security" can take many forms, including making environments safer by removing weapons. UCP teams in Mindanao, South Sudan and Colombia have assisted with security and influenced the provision of a safer environment. In Mindanao in 2011, there were 102 UCP staff across the whole area through eight offices working to make the area safer and increase the security of civilians.[107] There is good evidence that people are safer if there are no weapons. In Colombia, UCP organisations helped villages defend against displacement by refusing to allow weapons into the villages and making sure armed actors knew neither the villagers nor unarmed protectors were on the side of any of the armed actors.[108] Easthom describes how local people in South Sudan decided to create a weapons free zone, with the support of UCP teams to investigate any violations.[109] The examples of unarmed civilians in South Sudan and Mindanao facing local armed actors shows that even where it is feared that local consent is not present, there is still no automatic necessity for peacekeepers to be armed. The evidence suggests that unarmed civilians without the use or threat of force may be a successful peacekeeping option under these circumstances.

Capacity building

Capacity building in violent conflict requires working both with armed actors (for example, to build responsibility for the protection of civilians) and also local communities, leaders and local government. By developing good relationships with all actors, UCP is able to work on human rights training or alternative strategies which reduce the violence towards civilians. Mindanao is a particularly good example as some of the military leaders in Mindanao promoted unarmed civilians taking on the work of patrol, investigation and reporting. The UCP team in Mindanao trained military personnel in International Humanitarian Law, and Human Rights.[110]

Capacity building by UCP also includes training in local community based protection methods, healing and trauma, and dialogue. The trainings come after the relationship building has begun, when local people or partners, or even armed actors, want to increase the effectiveness of their protection work. This can include learning new models of protection and visiting other projects to share experiences, or how to reduce the barriers (such as recognising and dealing with trauma), or practicing skills in different circumstances such as shuttle diplomacy and opening conversations as an intervention strategy. In Israel/Palestine, McCarthy and Pinckney reported that interviewees saw this as essential to the effectiveness of UCP.[111] The Balkan Peace Team also undertook capacity building with communities and organisations, and Peace Brigades International works with local organisations to develop capacity to enable them to work on peace and human rights in their local communities in the long term[112].

Conclusions

The condition that peacekeeping requires military personnel and weapons is an assumption that is not supported by the evidence from the field. The evidence in Table 1 shows that in different

[107] Furnari 2016a
[108] PBI n.d.
[109] Eastholm 2015
[110] Furnari 2016:157
[111] McCarthy and Pinckney 2016:104
[112] Schweitzer and Clark 2002, PBI 2009

projects, unarmed civilians are successfully carrying out the tasks of peacekeeping, protecting civilians and preventing and reducing violence. It shows that the term 'peacekeeping' can refer to more than the use of armed military personnel, it can include unarmed civilians being the 'peacekeepers'.

The assumption that an armed actor will not yield to anything except a weapon has been demonstrated to be false on many occasions.

The evidence from 35 years of UCP shows that peacekeeping can be done without military or other uniformed personnel who carry weapons and that the use of UCP can reduce the negative impacts that are brought by the use of armed military personnel.

The lack of study and debate of UCP within peacekeeping studies has limited the options for peacekeeping and it is time to address this issue. While there is plenty of evidence that UCP works where it has been studied, too often the assumption that UCP has nothing to offer means that it is not fully included in the options that are considered, and this has led to an incomplete understanding of what makes peacekeeping effective, and a partial understanding of how peacekeeping works.

In the same way that other fields such as humanitarian action, peacebuilding, and demining have developed new thinking and new approaches over the last three decades, peacekeeping needs new approaches. In peacekeeping too many actors are tied to a single response, defined by inputs and activities instead of outcomes and impacts, and this has locked actors into only one response: peacekeeping delivered by armed military (or other uniformed) systems and organisations. The reason that AMP dominates is not because it has been shown to produce better results, but because it is too often assumed that there is simply no alternative. As a result UCP is insufficiently resourced, which leads to a cycle of even fewer resources. While there are clear reasons that many people find UCP an unlikely success story, this response cannot remain unchallenged in the face of evidence of the success and utility of UCP. The paradoxical nature of confronting violence with unarmed civilians may not always be a disadvantage after all; it may help to unlock some complex and intractable situations and it addresses the disadvantages of using military in peacekeeping. One of the greatest challenges for UCP is widespread prejudice that 'it can't possibly work'.

The blurring of boundaries between peacekeeping and peace enforcement does not benefit those in need of support to reduce the violence they face, but rather benefits the established military paradigm. By separating the activities of peace enforcement and peacekeeping, and maintaining a focus on peacekeeping as a distinct activity, this paper has presented evidence that there is another way to reduce violence, prevent the spread of war and support ceasefires, by working with unarmed civilians.

There are many areas that require further research, for example the changing humanitarian landscape where attacks on humanitarian workers are increasing requires better understanding of the differences between humanitarian aid workers and unarmed civilian peacekeepers, including how they work and how they are perceived. We need to understand the structures within which UCP operates and continue Coy's work on the privilege used by peacekeepers. It is clear that we need to understand more about the costs and limitations for all types of peacekeeping.

In contrast to authors[113] who suggest that robust or cosmopolitan peacekeeping is an appropriate response to the increasing complexity and weaknesses of peacekeeping operations in increasingly complex situations, UCP offers a different view that increasing militarisation, hostility and use of force will limit our ability to respond. A nonviolent, locally based and democratic peacekeeping option will compensate for some of the disadvantages of AMP and truly provide more space for imaginative responses.

By challenging the assumption that peacekeeping is primarily based on military personnel with weapons, we can create better options in peacekeeping so that our analysis of what is needed can draw on a wider range of evidence-based responses, including civilian run peacekeeping operations with no reliance on the military or weapons.

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[113] Ramsbotham et al 2015; Bellamy and Williams 2010

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