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Rethinking Vygotsky and language acquisition

Stephen Newman

Vygotsky 1896-1934

Wittgenstein 1889-1951


Complexities

- Links between FLA and SLA
- Theory proliferation
- Theory incompatibility
- Theory of mind Chomsky Vygotsky

Confusion: First language acquisition and second language acquisition

"It is well known that to learn a foreign language at school and to develop one's native language involve two entirely different processes... And yet, in spite of all these differences, the acquisition of the foreign and the native languages belongs to one general class of the processes of speech development" (Vygotsky, 1986, p.159).


Vygotsky's account...



Earliest stages of thought and speech are biological based on an "innate, natural form of behaviour".

Pre-intellectual. Pre-linguistic. Reactions. Aged about 2, the child has moved on to the developmental continuum.

"Inner speech develops through a slow accumulation of functional and structural changes. that it branches off from the child's external speech simultaneously with the differentiation of the social and the egocentric functions of speech, and finally that the speech structures mastered by the child become the basic structures of his thinking" (Vygotsky, 1986, p.94)



Examining Vygotsky's account...

What is the evidence for it?

Is it a socio-cultural theory of language acquisition?

Does it have a coherent theory of meaning?

"The answer to "Would you like a cup of tea?" is never 'No, I don't want a cup of tea," but a simple "No." Obviously, such a sentence is possible only because its subject is tacitly understood by both parties." (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 236). "To "Has your brother read this book?" no one ever replies, "Yes, my brother has read this book." The answer is a short "Yes," or "Yes, he has." (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 236) Now let us imagine that several people are waiting for a bus. No one will say, on seeing the bus approach, "The bus for which we are waiting is coming." The sentence is likely to be an abbreviated "Coming," or some such expression, because the subject is plain from the situation" (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 236).

But...

• It is quite easy to imagine when the replies that Vygotsky says would never be given, would be given.

Abbreviation

Is the bus for which we are waiting, full-up or empty?

Is the bus for which we are waiting, an old or a new Routemaster?

"Is the bus for which we are waiting, coming?"

"Coming" [as an abbreviation for "The bus for which we are waiting is coming"]

• Clearly then, as Jones puts it, "if you cannot decide or cannot find good reasons for starting with one 'expanded' form rather than another, then the whole abbreviation hypothesis is in some trouble" (Jones, 2009, p. 171).


So, does the evidence support Vygotsky's argument?

- No
- No evidence of the continuum, abbreviation, and internalisation
- The whole continuum is inferred, not observed.

Earliest stages of thought and speech are biological based on an "innate, natural form of behaviour".

Pre-intellectual. Pre-linguistic. Reactions. Aged about 2, the child has moved on to the developmental continuum.

"Inner speech develops through a slow accumulation of functional and structural changes. that it branches off from the child's external speech simultaneously with the differentiation of the social and the egocentric functions of speech, and finally that the speech structures mastered by the child become the basic structures of his thinking" (Vygotsky, 1986, p.94)



In summary...

For these reasons

- There is no evidence of Vygotsky's notions of a continuum, of internalisation and of abbreviation.
- It is not a sociocultural theory
- Its theory of meaning is incoherent

Clarifications: Wittgenstein What's the evidence?

- Conceptual not empirical, but...
- Real and imagined examples
- Look; don't think.
- 'it disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words' (*PI*, §5). The many and diverse examples thus counteract our tendency to ask questions and make statements which ignore our actual uses of language (*PI*, §§23-27):
- A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example (*PI*, §593, p.155e).
- "I'll teach you differences" (Shakespeare: *King Lear*, Act 1; Scene 4)

Language games

- We need to pay attention to the language-game in which such expressions occur.
- Socio-cultural.

Earliest stages of thought and speech are biological based on an "innate, natural form of behaviour".

Pre-intellectual. Pre-linguistic. Reactions.

SOCIAL LOOK OBSERVATIONS

Written speech

Verbal and non-verbal behaviour

Language-games

Nothing is hidden


"Inner speech develops through a slow accumulation of functional and structural changes. that it branches off from the child's external speech simultaneously with the differentiation of the social and the egocentric functions of speech, and finally that the speech structures mastered by the child become the basic structures of his thinking" (Vygotsky, 1986, p.94) Inner Speech↓Thought↓↓Motivation

nternal

External

Moreover

• Articles which claim support form Vygotsky show no evidence of the continuum etc., nor could they. They only things they do show are the early bits and all that can be explained with Wittgensteinian reminders.



Structure

Vygotsky's account

ontinuum Continu Inferred. Not observed Internal Unexplained Incoherent Internalisation / abbrev EmpiricaNo.Inferred; not observed Empirical observations **Only in initial stages;** Socio-cultural aspects otherwise individualistic Theory of meaning Theory of me

Wittgenstein's account

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