Managing Risk and Security

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Introduction

The World Cup is one of the largest sporting spectacles globally. Subsequently, the tournament has been employed as a scholarly site of analysis across economic, political, social, and cultural fields. Within these fields, 'risk' and 'security' of previous men's World Cups have been examined from management, tourism, sociology and political science perspectives (Wong and Chadwick, 2017; Jennings and Lodge, 2011; Toohey et al., 2003; Klauser, 2008; Lee Ludvigsen, 2018; Cornelissen, 2011; Rookwood, 2019; Toohey and Taylor, 2014). Against this background, this chapter examines the processes of risk and security management at the World Cup. The chapter explores contemporary concepts, issues and cases related to the World Cup's risk and security management.

While risk management is challenging to define, we refer to the 'proactive process' involving 'assessing all possible risks to the events and its stakeholders by strategically anticipating, preventing, minimizing, and planning responses to eliminate or mitigate those identified risks' (Leopkey and Parent, 2009: 199). Therefore, the World Cup is exposed to diversely complex risks (real and perceived) and security issues. In the growing, interdisciplinary literature, the emergence of risk and security complexes at sport mega-events are often pinpointed to the terrorist attacks at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich and the 11th September (9/11) attack in the United States (Lee Ludvigsen, 2018; Giulianotti and Klauser, 2012; Wong and Chadwick, 2017). While the risk context and risk profile of every separate World Cup is unique, there are typical considerations, as this chapter discusses further.

Our chapter starts with unpacking what types of risks and threats organizers, planners, and stakeholders must account for before World Cup staging. Throughout our discussions, we

employ examples from previous World Cups. Second, we discuss the concept of 'security knowledge networks' (Boyle, 2011), applying this to the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. Third, our chapter explores the management of risks and security in stadiums and fan zones as two critical spaces at contemporary World Cups. Fifth, we highlight some more general risks associated with staging a World Cup including resource allocation and infrastructure investment. Finally, our conclusions are provided with some recommendations for future research.

Risk Types and Security Issues

As this chapter argues, the risks and security issues that mega-events like the World Cup are exposed to are complex. They vary according to the risk profile of the relevant tournament. Moreover, the relevant World Cup's risk profile will depend on both *internal* (such as the geographies of the host country, upcoming 'rival' fixtures', football-related violence trends) and *external* circumstances and factors (e.g., terrorism trends, a global pandemic or the political climate surrounding the event). Therefore, the key point is that World Cups are never isolated from their broader contexts and surrounding uncertainties. As Wong and Chadwick (2017: 595) write, the World Cup – as the most-watched sporting event worldwide – 'carries exceptional risks including terrorist incidents, football violence, protests, budget overspends [and] operational failures'. In that sense, the forthcoming subsections employ recent World Cup cases as examples to highlight the types of risks and security problems that might exist before and during a World Cup. However, we acknowledge that the discussed categories, risk examples do not represent an exhaustive list. Instead, we discuss significant risks requiring consideration.

Supporter Violence

One prominent risk that World Cups are exposed to is supporter violence, or 'hooliganism' - the latter being a term lacking a universal definition. This is exemplified by the case of the Germany World Cup in 2006. Although there were no major incidents, there were disturbances recorded at three games (Poland v Germany, England v Sweden and England v Ecuador; Wong & Chadwick, 2017). On the day of Germany v Poland, more than 432 arrests in Dortmund were reported, many of which preventative arrests related to the match. These arrests came in addition to several police-fan confrontations and stand-offs (Schreiber and Adang, 2010: 483).

Episodes of supporter violence at the World Cup are not necessarily confined to the inside of the stadiums or fan zones. As the evidence suggests, they may occur across the various host cities: in public squares, bars or city centres throughout the event (ibid.). Moreover, the media

discourses leading up to World Cups usually speculate on the prospects of World Cup-related supporter violence (Lee Ludvigsen, 2018). Ultimately, to counter any issues related to supporter violence, World Cups require large-scale policing and crowd management operations (Stott and Pearson, 2007) including transnational information exchange and collaboration (FIFA, 2010). In a pre-emptive manner, different games and fan groups are also commonly classified according to risk assessments (i.e., 'high' or 'low' risk games).

Terrorism

As Giulianotti and Klauser (2010: 52) discuss, the threat of terrorism and political violence represents both a symbolic and political threat, one that can 'endanger the athletes, spectators, and local population' of a sporting event. Whilst no major incidents have taken place at recent World Cups, mass crowds and events *have been* targeted by terrorists in recent years. In November 2015, a terrorist attack targeted *Stade de France* in Paris, where France played against Germany in a friendly game. This attack had considerable impacts on football events' security and risk management (Cleland and Cashmore, 2018). The threat of terrorism at sporting events is commonly secured against through exceptional security measures. For example, the South Africa World Cup's security measures in 2010 included human-crewed aircraft and bomb-squad tools and expertise (Giulianotti and Klauser, 2010). Whether the terrorist threat remains perceived or real, organizers, planners and authorities cannot ignore it. Doing so can construct a climate of fear and anxiety among event tourists and travelling supporters.

Crime

According to Giulianotti and Klauser (2010), urban crime is one risk that event planners must account for pre-event. One of the primary concerns before the 2010 South Africa World Cup was the 'prevalent criminal activity in South Africa' (Wong and Chadwick, 2017: 586). Before the 2010 World Cup, it was argued that 'crime and safety issues in South Africa are still clouding the destination image of South Africa and thus damping the general enthusiasm among local and international stakeholders for 2010' (Donaldson and Ferreira, 2009: 3). As this case shows, the host city's crime rates will often be frequently referred to in the media before tournament commencement (The Guardian, 2009; BBC, 2010).

For the 2010 World Cup, the authorities, therefore, took extra measures against criminal activity. As Cornelissen and Maennig (2010: 103) write:

> A few incidents of crime occurred against Confederation Cup visitors (mainly robberies), which were widely reported in the international media. A well developed and efficiently

implemented security plan was a major component of the positive atmosphere that reigned at the 2006 World Cup. To gain the same effects, South Africa had to do much to counter widespread cynicism about the ability of overstretched security and policing infrastructure to deliver an effective World Cup anticrime strategy. For the 2010 World Cup 41 000 security staff were eventually deployed.

Subsequently, serious crime declined during this World Cup, whereas the tournament 'proceeded with few major incidents' (Cornelissen, 2011: 3231). Consequently, a host country's (or city's) crime rates are a distinctive risk that event organizers - in tandem with authorities - must counter to ensure that visitors and fans feel safe and to improve destination image.

Infectious Diseases

The coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic impacted the whole 'Football World' and showed that sports events are incredibly vulnerable to infectious diseases (Parnell et al., 2020). However, sporting events were impacted by epidemics or pandemics in a pre-COVID-19 age, too. The 2003 Women's World Cup best exemplifies this risk, originally due to be staged in China between 23rd September - 11th October 2003. In light of a SARS epidemic in the region, FIFA - consulting with the World Health Organization (WHO) (FIFA, 2003) - moved the tournament to the USA, hosted by six cities. Meanwhile, China hosted the 2007 World Cup. Indeed, the organization of future World Cups may be impacted by infectious diseases, too. It has already been reported that the venue selection of the 2026 Men's World Cup in Mexico, Canada and the US was delayed because of the COVID-19 pandemic (Reuters, 2020). Collectively, what this demonstrates, is that epidemics and pandemics are inherently unpredictable risks that event organizers and stakeholders have to account for before and throughout tournaments, alongside the other risks and security issues.

A Networked Approach to Risk and Security Management

Any mega-event is the culmination of different networks. These differing and overlapping networks or stakeholder are imperative to event delivery. Therefore, any World Cup is structured through ties, interrelatedness, and interdependence between many individuals and organizations. For example, an event is made of and relies on, multiple government departments, tourism, events, sports, media, and other private sector organizations (Parent, 2008), creating inter-organizational networks. These organizations most likely involve multiple cities and cross international boundaries, creating inter-city and inter-country networks, respectively (O'Brien & Gardiner, 2006). These inter-organizational and transnational networks are vitally important, not only for successful event delivery but also for managing risk and security.

The concept of 'knowledge networks' (Boyle, 2011) can be regarded as particularly useful and relevant to understand risk and security management at sport mega-events in the current world. Whilst the tournament-specific regulations and requirements may be relatively fixed for every World Cup; each security delivery remains influenced by the event's local characteristics. However, in sport mega-event risk and security management, host nations and event organizers are increasingly drawing upon examples, templates and knowledge that derive from previously staged events (Cornelissen, 2011; Boyle, 2011).

The actors, agencies, and organizations involved as security stakeholders cut across private, public and voluntary sectors (Taylor and Toohey, 2015). The linkages between these actors are typically networked. Boyle (2011: 170) refer to these shifting linkages as 'security knowledge networks' based around knowledge transfer and learning. These networks do not merely 'facilitate the movement of event-specific security expertise between geographically and temporally distant locales' (ibid.) but also facilitate the movement of security rationales and technologies on a global level. Therefore, through networks of relevant knowledge and expertise, involving; law enforcements, intelligence agencies, sporting federations, security consultants and technology firms (ibid.), relevant know-how is transferred onto upcoming football mega-events and applied by the organizers and wider stakeholder groups who are responsible for the risk management and public safety.

We may use the concept of 'security knowledge networks' to make sense of the important case of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. This was the first World Cup to be staged in Africa and took place between the 11th June – 11th July 2010 in ten stadiums spread across nine host cities. As aforementioned, the pre-event discourses were characterized by scepticism concerning the event's organization, logistics and the country's reputation for being crime-ridden (Wong and Chadwick, 2017). Despite this scepticism, it was stated prior to the World Cup by then-FIFA President Joseph Blatter that:

> Security is a matter for the government, and we have received adequate guarantees in this regard, so there is no reason to have any doubts. The FIFA World Cup is about enjoyment, and I am convinced that we will have a wonderful festival in South Africa (quoted in FIFA, 2010)

Accordingly, this World Cup's security costs came to around 13 billion Rand (Toohey and Taylor, 2014). And moreover, it was reported that South African authorities 'drew assistance from the organisers of the 2006 FIFA World Cup, mainly in the form of information and intelligence sharing and contingency training' (Cornelissen, 2011: 3227). Furthermore, the police – in collaboration with Interpol and international football authorities kept a database of

'known hooligans or criminals' in order to prevent these individuals from entering the stadiums (ibid.: 3229). As stated, before the event, Interpol would also provide South African police with key operational support (FIFA, 2010).

Firstly, this yields insight into knowledge transfer processes between a past event (that is, Germany 2006) and an upcoming event (South Africa 2010). Additionally, the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup also seemingly served as an important platform for learning and knowledge acquisition (ibid.). Secondly, we can see how information sharing occurred *throughout* the month-long tournament as well. Furthermore, throughout the event's duration, the security delivery was made up of an assemblage of private and public actors. This included private security partners, national and local law enforcement, and volunteers, who operated within the same overarching security field and dealt with various and overlapping security and risk responsibilities (Eisenhauer et al., 2014). However, given the many actors involved in an event's security delivery, this may lead to complications. For example, it was reported that over 100 private security guards went on strike during the South Africa World Cup over payment disputes, which meant that local police had to take over the stewards' responsibilities (CNN, 2010).

Overall, the knowledge network approach (see Boyle, 2011) to the security and risk governance at the World Cup demonstrates wider security and risk management trends. This includes transnational collaboration and the networked structure of private/public security actors as apparent in the contemporary world (see Dupont, 2004). Moreover, the World Cup's specific editions may reveal the overlapping responsibilities of private/public agencies who operate within many of the same spaces and places of the World Cup, two of which we turn to next: the stadium and the fan zone.

Stadiums and Fan Zones

A World Cup's risk management and security delivery are always likely to leave significant footprints on the relevant host city's or country's places and urban life. However, this section zooms in on two of the main event spaces within the vast World Cup 'theatre'. That is the stadium where matches are played and the fan zone where fans can assemble to watch live-actions on enormous screens. Naturally, these are among the most heavily visited spaces through the life-time of any World Cup. Subsequently, the need to make these spaces safe and secure increases in line with the mass crowds gathered within them.

Typically, the stadiums used in FIFA competitions will conform to strict safety and security regulations (FIFA, n.d.-a). Typically, stadium entry is subject to checks and necessary accreditation and identification to access the different stadium zones (VIP rooms, media stands). Stadiums, meanwhile, are typically policed by stewards, private security and other surveillance technologies such as CCTV. Moreover, as Klauser (2008) writes, so-called 'outer security rings' are typically set up outside the World Cup stadium. These may extend for up to a kilometre outside the relevant stadium and operate as a pre-defined space and fenced barrier to the stadium for arriving fan groups. Accordingly, these represent 'neutralized spaces' in which the official partners and sponsors primarily are facilitated for (ibid.: 181). Meanwhile, stadium rings are typically populated by different security actors, including volunteers and private and public security services (Eick, 2010).

So-called 'fan zones' have emerged as popular spaces at recent World Cups where they are officially named and branded as 'FIFA Fan Fests' (FIFA, n.d.-b). This is in light of the increased popularity of World Cups as tourist destinations for football enthusiasts. They have increased their popularity following the 2006 World Cup in Germany, where fan zones were popularly erected and visited (Kolyperas and Sparks, 2018; Haferburg et al., 2009). Fan zones are geographically confined areas surrounded by fences. They are accessible to the general public and live-screen World Cup matches and actions on giant screens. Because they are often free to enter, fan zones are primarily visited by fans who have travelled to the World Cup host cities without stadium tickets. Yet, they are sometimes used as a pre-game or post-game destination by fans with match tickets.

Inside these temporary spaces, public viewing events are staged, and supporters may engage in various activities (Lee Ludvigsen, 2021). Fan zones are often characterized by their many consumption opportunities and entertainment activities, including live music and competitions. This again contributes to making fan zones spaces of celebration and festivity. According to FIFA (n.d.), the highest registered combined attendance in a fan zone on a World Cup match-day was on the 25th June 2018 when Uruguay played against host nation Russia, when 499,000 fans attended the 11 different fan zones that were set up in the various host cities.

Due to fan zones' increased popularity inside the World Cup landscapes and in the world of sport mega-events, so has the need to secure fan zones increased. As Toohey and Taylor (2014: 192) argue, World Cup security has, since 2006, extended geographically to include fan zones. In terms of security and surveillance, the public viewing events inside fan zones are in 'many ways treated like stadiums' (Klauser, 2008: 64). As existing research on fan zone security and

surveillance demonstrates, fan zones provide an opportunity for the event organizer to govern fans 'by fun' (Lauss and Szigetvari, 2010). While fans are engaged in consumption-related activities, they are simultaneously monitored and regulated by various surveillance features and security actors (ibid.).

Simultaneously, the fan zone risk and security management involve numerous precautionary security measures such as; bag checks, control over people admitted/exiting the fan zone, and limited entry at certain times (Haferburg et al., 2009). Moreover, it is heavily restricted which items visitors may bring into the fan zones. Typically, fans will not be allowed to bring their own drinks or snacks (ibid.) since official sponsors and partners enjoy exclusive rights to advertise and sell their products (Eisenhauer et al., 2014). Thus, whilst representing separate spaces, the stadium and fan zone share some similarities in security practices and policies and risk management. However, fan zones may be more unpredictable than stadiums in terms of attendee numbers (Toohey and Taylor, 2014). They are more cluttered and free-flowing, as visitors are not assigned to specific seats as they would be inside stadiums.

Economic Risks

While some would argue hosting a World Cup speeds up much-needed infrastructure investment and development, this is often a fallacy. This 'opportunity' comes at a substantial cost, on average, 252 percent higher than budgeted (Flyvbjerg and Stewart, 2012). Here lies another considerable risk, resource allocation. The lack of effective budgeting, rising costs, lack of time, among other factors, mean the overspending takes resources away from other, potentially better returning, infrastructure investment. For example, Brazil, hosting the 2014 World Cup, overspent their stadium budget by approximately $2 billion, meaning their light rail, monorail, airport infrastructure, among other critical infrastructure, were not completed. Brazil's reported total expenditure was roughly $11 billion, for in effect, twelve mostly disused stadiums and unfinished national infrastructure. Consequently, allocating resources for hosting the World Cup meant Brazil did not allocate resources to complete the economically viable infrastructure. Considering Brazil is struggling to manage deepening economic inequality, improving a fragmented education system would have been a better investment (Medeiros, 2016).

The risk of significant infrastructure investment is not just ineffective resource allocation but presents labour force risks. Since the infrastructure projects are condensed into unusually tight (often unrealistic) timescales and coincide, there needs to be a considerable and experienced

labour force. Given the rarity of such events, it is unlikely many nations have a labour force to fulfil such projects: the result, the migrant workforce. While there are risks such as leakage from the hosts economy, relying on a large migrant workforce, safety is more apparent. For example, in preparation for hosting the World Cup in 2022, Qatar has probably the most ambitious infrastructure plan, spending $200 billion on stadiums, new airport, new city centre, hotels, new road and rail networks, to name a few. The problem is they have a small labour force; consequently, they rely predominantly on a migrant workforce, which has grown 39% to 2.1million - 75% of the population. Unfortunately, this heavy reliance on migrant labour (without getting into national policy) has resulted in 6,500 reported migrant worker deaths (Pattison et al., 2021); which will forever overshadow Qatar's World Cup story.

Conclusion and Future Research

Every World Cup is surrounded by a set of diverse, unpredictable and unique risks that must be mitigated, eliminated or identified. In this vein, this chapter examines World Cup risk and security management processes. This chapter argues that both internal and external trends largely impact the security-related efforts and the risk management processes of a World Cup. Here, the internal trends speak to the popularity of World Cups as tourist destinations, the rise of fan zones, local contexts, regulations and legislation. The external trends relate to global events, the geopolitical context of the tournament, and prospects of terrorism, crime, or epidemics surrounding the event. Collectively, this impacts the exclusive risk profile of each World Cup, and security stakeholders must act pre-emptively whilst drawing upon existing knowledge from past events. This chapter shows the networked structure of security and risk planning, which occurs between editions of the World Cup. In that sense, we argue that the concept of 'security knowledge networks' (Boyle, 2011) can be usefully applied to make sense of the global, local and, indeed, 'glocal' processes of risk and security management before, during and after World Cups. Although their transient timespan characterizes each World Cup tournament, these networks may (re-) activate ahead of forthcoming tournaments, facilitating a continuous learning cycle.

To add to the existing evidence base (see Cornelissen, 2011; Wong and Chadwick, 2017; Klauser, 2008), we end this chapter by suggesting three specific recommendations for future work in risk and security management at the World Cup. These are also relevant to the wider socio-economic study of global sport. As shown, the study of the World Cup and sport mega-event 'risk' and 'security' is interdisciplinary. It includes contributions from sports management, tourism and event management, sociology, and political science. Therefore, we

encourage an interdisciplinary approach to the following research questions. Firstly, as Taylor and Toohey (2015: 393) argue, different cultures can impact the 'expectations and approaches to managing security and safety issues' at sporting events. To this end, researchers should examine the importance of geographical, cultural, social and political contexts on forthcoming World Cups' risk and security management and planning. Particularly, there is a pressing need for future research on the risk management of Women's World Cups and the World Cups below senior level (e.g., FIFA U-20 or U-17 World Cup). Secondly, and more event-specific, it will be interesting to explore how 'security' and 'risk' are framed in the pre-event discourses before the 2026 World Cup to be co-hosted by Canada, Mexico and the USA (Beissel and Kohe, 2020). Especially given the geopolitical questions and power dynamics attached to this World Cup format. Finally, we underline the importance of understanding the risks associated with infrastructure investment and resource allocation, especially as more developing countries enter the World Cup hosting market, is vital to understanding the broader risks of hosting a World Cup.

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