Abstract
Belief in free will has been shown to positively associate with socially desirable behaviors and outcomes, such as meaning and satisfaction. However, studies have not focused exclusively on the beliefs of incompatibilist free will skeptics. Such skeptics may have different interpretations about what it means to disbelieve in free will than participants typically classified as free will disbelievers. Across three studies including a manipulation (total N = 620), the research examined the relationship between belief in free will and meaning and satisfaction in incompatibilist free will skeptics. Studies 1 and 2 found no differences in meaning and satisfaction between incompatibilist free will skeptics and participants believing more strongly in free will. Study 3 found that participants manipulated to disbelieve in free will perceived life to be significantly less meaningful and satisfactory than incompatibilist free will skeptics. Moreover, incompatibilist free will skeptics did not perceive life to be less meaningful and satisfactory than a control condition possessing significantly stronger belief in free will. Therefore, the negative outcomes associated with weaker belief in free will may not be applicable to all free will disbelievers. Although a life full of meaning and satisfaction is important for well-being, believing in free will is not, at least not for some, an important contributor.
Official URL
More Information
Divisions: | School of Humanities and Social Sciences |
---|---|
Identification Number: | https://doi.org/10.1177/00221678241305425 |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Publisher: | SAGE Publications |
Additional Information: | © The Author(s) 2024 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | 1701 Psychology; 1702 Cognitive Sciences; Social Psychology; 5203 Clinical and health psychology; 5205 Social and personality psychology |
SWORD Depositor: | Symplectic |
Depositing User (symplectic) | Deposited by Mann, Elizabeth |
Date Deposited: | 20 Dec 2024 14:39 |
Last Modified: | 21 Dec 2024 01:18 |
Item Type: | Article |